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THE LAW OF IDENTITY HARM 
SARAH DADUSH* 
ABSTRACT 
Identity harm refers to the anguish experienced by consumers who learn 
that their efforts to consume in line with their personal values have been 
undermined by a company’s false or exaggerated promises about its wares. 
When broken, other-regarding “virtuous promises” about products (e.g., 
eco-friendly, responsible, fair-trade, cruelty free, conflict free) give rise to 
identity harm by making consumers unwittingly complicit in hurting others. 
A leading example is the Volkswagen emissions scandal: when 
environmentally-conscious purchasers of Volkswagen’s “clean diesel” cars 
learned that the vehicles were in fact hyper-polluting, they experienced 
identity harm because of their complicity in a scheme that hurt the planet 
and the health of their communities.  
As more people become sensitized to environmental and social (labor 
and human rights) sustainability challenges, they are also becoming 
increasingly concerned about their role in aggravating these challenges 
through their individual consumption. Identity harm surfaces against the 
backdrop of an under-regulated market for virtuous goods that is expanding 
to meet the demands of conscious consumers. Troublingly, those who 
experience identity harm currently have little recourse in private law, which 
reveals a serious deficit in our legal regime. This Article, one in a series, 
recommends correcting this protective deficit by operationalizing identity 
harm under tort, contract, and state consumer law, with a particular focus 
on the latter. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What happens when a consumer is sold halal meat that is not halal? Or 
when someone buys a “clean diesel” car that is actually hyper-polluting? Or 
a bar of chocolate that, unbeknownst to the consumer, was made using 
forced child labor? Does this give rise to any legally cognizable harm? Does 
the law provide any relief? This Article provides a name for the harm 
suffered in these kinds of cases, identity harm, and outlines legal 
mechanisms for addressing it. 
Identity harm is the anguish experienced by a consumer who learns that 
her efforts to consume in line with her personal values have been 
undermined by a company’s exaggerated or false promises about its wares. 
More specifically, identity harm arises when a consumer discovers that a 
company failed to honor the “virtuous promises” it had made concerning its 
wares (e.g., green, eco-friendly, fair-trade, cruelty free, conflict free, Made 
In America, and Kosher). Virtuous promises are currently under-policed by 
government regulators and, as a result, consumers are often over-exposed 
to “virtuous duperies” that can make them act contrary to their own values. 
Furthermore, consumers who try to bring legal claims against promise-
breaking companies are ill-equipped to do so, revealing serious 













law. This Article, one in a series, seeks to address these shortcomings by 
operationalizing identity harm as a new consumer protection tool.1  
I describe virtuous promises as those that are designed to resonate with 
consumers’ moral values, their standards for what constitutes acceptable or 
unacceptable behavior in the world. Because they possess a moral quality, 
virtuous promises are sensitive in a way that more technical promises—e.g., 
price, ingredients, and performance—are not. A particularly sensitive 
category of virtuous promises are those that are other-regarding, meaning 
that they contain an altruistic element or have implications for the well-
being of others, besides the consumer. For example, virtuous promises 
about a product’s social sustainability (labor and human rights) are other-
regarding in that they have implications for the well-being of the people 
involved in the production process. 
The other-regarding quality of some types of virtuous promises makes 
them particularly sensitive for a few reasons. First, as should be 
immediately apparent, the sense of personal responsibility involved with 
questions such as “Who do I want to be vis-à-vis other humans and the 
planet?” is an order of magnitude more profound than that involved with 
questions like “What image of myself do I want to project today?” or “Do I 
feel like savory or sweet?” or even “What brand of butter is best, given my 
cholesterol problems?” Second, when an other-regarding virtuous promise 
is broken, there is a real possibility that someone else, besides the consumer, 
suffers. For example, as a result of Volkswagen’s (VW) deception 
concerning its “clean diesels” that were actually illegally dirty, car owners 
were harmed, but so was the planet and the health of the communities where 
the cars were being driven. Third, the psychic effects of a broken other-
regarding virtuous promise can be quite severe, especially for “conscious 
consumers” who actively seek out sustainable products.2 It is this combined 
distress that identity harm seeks to capture and address.  
Today, a growing number of people are making big and small purchases 
that do some good or, more accurately, less harm in the world.3 Consumers 
                                                 
1. Sarah Dadush, Why You Should Be Unsettled by the Biggest Automotive Settlement in 
History, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. F. 1 (2018) [hereinafter Dadush, Why You Should Be Unsettled]; Sarah 
Dadush, Identity Harm, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 863 (2018) [hereinafter Dadush, Identity Harm]. 
2. Many terms exist to describe this type of consumption, including “conscientious,” “ethical,” 
and “responsible”; for consistency, I adopt “conscious consumption.” 
3. Complaint at 34, Sud v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 229 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2017) 
(No. 15-cv-03783) [hereinafter Sud Complaint] (quoting KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
THE CALIFORNIA TRANSPARENCY IN SUPPLY CHAINS ACT: A RESOURCE GUIDE, at i (2015), https://oag. 
ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/sb657/resource-guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2QW-5U5C]) (“In recent 
years, California consumers have demanded that producers provide greater transparency about goods 
brought to market. Consumers utilize this additional information to drive their purchasing decisions, and 
 











increasingly consider the effects of their purchases on the health of the 
planet and the well-being of the humans who participate in (or are otherwise 
affected by) the production process. And the market is responding. More 
and more goods, from coffee to cleaning products to cosmetics to cars, are 
being promoted as “better for the world” through direct advertising and 
labeling, but also less directly, for example on company websites, in annual 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports, supplier agreements, and 
industry codes of conduct.4  
In theory, having access to more sustainability information should help 
consumers make better choices based on a product’s mix of price, 
functionality, and virtuous attributes. In practice, however, the quantity and 
quality of information that consumers are exposed to is often inadequate or 
                                                 
various indicators suggest that Californians are not alone. A recent survey of western consumers revealed 
that people would be willing to pay extra for products they could identify as being made under good 
working conditions.”); see also WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., SUSTAINABLE 
CONSUMPTION FACTS AND TRENDS FROM A BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE 6 (2008), http://www.saiplatform. 
org/uploads/Modules/Library/WBCSD_Sustainable_Consumption_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8VL-
WEA6] (“Consumers are increasingly concerned about environmental, social and economic issues, and 
increasingly willing to act on those concerns.”); FISHWISE, TRAFFICKED II: AN UPDATED SUMMARY OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE SEAFOOD INDUSTRY 6 (2014), https://www.oceanfdn.org/sites/ 
default/files/Trafficked_II_FishWise_2014%20%281%29.compressed.pdf [https://perma.cc/S82Z-HW 
Q7] (revealing that 88% of consumers would stop buying a product if it was associated with human 
rights abuses and 70% of consumers would pay a premium for a product certified to be free of human 
rights abuses); Doing Well by Doing Good, NIELSEN (June 17, 2014), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/ins 
ights/reports/2014/doing-well-by-doing-good.html [https://perma.cc/QU67-RC2E] (“More than half 
(55%) of global respondents in Nielsen’s corporate social responsibility survey say they are willing to 
pay extra for products and services from companies that are committed to positive social and 
environmental impact—an increase from 50 percent in 2012 and 45 percent in 2011.”). 
4. See Sud Complaint, supra note 3; Doing Well by Doing Good, supra note 3; FISHWISE, supra 
note 3; WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., supra note 3; Lucy Atkinson, The Wild West of 
Eco-Labels: Sustainability Claims Are Confusing Consumers, GUARDIAN, (July 4, 2014), https://www. 
theguardian.com/sustainable-business/eco-labels-sustainability-trust-corporate-government [https://per 
ma.cc/S7CZ-7QDZ] (“Today’s consumer is faced with an estimated 455 eco-labels across 25 industry 
categories, from energy and clothing to food and household cleaners. But very few of these labels give 
people meaningful guidance in choosing environmentally superior products.”); Klaus G. Grunert et al., 
Sustainability Labels on Food Products: Consumer Motivation, Understanding and Use, 44 FOOD 
POL’Y 177, 177 (2014) (“While the growth in labels and accompanying communication initiatives may 
be interpreted as a sign of success . . . label overload and gaps in the understanding of both the general 
concept of sustainability and of specific sustainability labels may result in consumer confusion and limit 
the use of such labels.”); Marcy Nicks Moody, Note, Warning: May Cause Warming: Potential Trade 
Challenges to Private Environmental Labels, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1402 (2012) (“Many of these 
products bear labels that are administered by private standards and certification systems, such as MSC-
certified seafood, UTZ-certified tea, Fairtrade coffee, or Rainforest Alliance chocolate. Demand has 
prompted firms, nongovernmental organizations (‘NGOs’), and private foundations to invest hundreds 
of millions of dollars to support the creation and implementation of such systems.”); David Vogel, The 
Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct, 49 BUS. & SOC’Y 68, 77 (2010) [hereinafter Vogel, 
Private Regulation of Corporate Conduct] (“[T]he proliferation of industry codes of conduct and 















overwhelming (or both), which leads to consumer confusion.5 With more 
companies entering what David Vogel calls the “market for virtue,”6 it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to compare virtuous promises across 
products and to tell apart truly sustainable products from those that only 
claim to be. This state of affairs creates too much room for virtuous duperies 
that exploit consumers’ expectations and give rise to identity harm.  
Although different kinds of broken virtuous promises can elicit identity 
harm, this Article focuses on promises pertaining to sustainability for two 
reasons. First, by definition, sustainability-related virtuous promises are 
other-regarding as they pertain to the planet and the people involved in a 
good’s production; as such, if they are broken, these promises implicate the 
consumer in causing injury to others. This dynamic produces some of the 
more egregious instances of identity harm. Second, with respect to 
sustainability, transnational corporations (TNCs) operate within something 
akin to a regulatory vacuum, a reality that undermines the protection of labor 
and human rights globally and threatens the survival of our planet.7 Here, 
consumers have significant—if untapped—authority as “civil regulators” 
who can vote with their dollars to express support for, or objection to, 
certain types of corporate conduct and so wield their purchasing power to 
influence TNCs’ sustainability performance.8 Of course, consumers are not 
the only protagonists acting on the sustainability stage, nor should they be. 
Nevertheless, conceiving of consumers as (co)regulators and better 
outfitting them to serve this function is important for achieving 
sustainability objectives. Operationalizing identity harm would equip 
consumers to serve more effectively as civil regulators and supply them 
with the means for safeguarding their own personal values. Put differently, 
identity harm can be a tool for acting locally—geographically, but also at 
an individual level—in order to effect change globally.  
                                                 
5. Atkinson, supra note 4; Grunert et al., supra note 4, at 177; Vogel, Private Regulation of 
Corporate Conduct, supra note 4, at 77.  
6. DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE (2005) [hereinafter VOGEL, MARKET FOR 
VIRTUE]. 
7. See discussion infra, note 56. 
8. VOGEL, MARKET FOR VIRTUE, supra note 6, at 9 (“Civil regulation [is] an effort to fill the 
governance gap between the law and the market. . . . [It] constitutes a ‘soft’ form of regulation in that it 
does not impose legally enforceable standards for corporate conduct. By applying pressure directly to 
companies, activists and organizations seek to foster changes in business practices that national 
governments and international law are unlikely or unwilling to bring about.”); Douglas A. Kysar, 
Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 526, 607–08 (2004) [hereinafter Kysar, Preferences for Processes] (referring to the 
“utility that consumers might derive from participating in a marketplace that affords the opportunity to 
‘vote’ through private consumption on important matters of public policy.”). 
 











In an earlier article, I discussed several cases dealing with broken 
sustainability-related promises that perfectly described identity harm, even 
if the actual term was not used.9 The leading case is the VW emissions 
scandal known as “Dieselgate” where the automaker’s line of aggressively 
advertised clean diesel vehicles turned out to be anything but 
environmentally friendly, emitting up to forty times the legal limit of 
polluting nitrogen oxides.10 The complaints filed in the multi-district 
litigation repeatedly reference the distress experienced by car owners who 
learned that their vehicles were in fact hyper-polluting.11 I explained that, 
had the cars not been illegal as a result of being equipped with software 
designed to cheat emissions testing equipment in violation of the Clean Air 
Act and because they produced emissions in excess of national standards, 
the identity harm experienced by the Dieselgate victims, no matter how 
profound, would not have been adequately addressed.12 This troubling 
conclusion can be explained as follows: First, the revelation of the cars’ 
illegality effectively drove their market value down to zero dollars, resulting 
in a huge economic loss for car owners and, consequently, the largest 
settlement in automotive history.13 Absent the illegality, however, the drop 
in the cars’ market value would likely have been far less dramatic, which 
would have substantially reduced the amount of compensation awarded to 
Dieselgate victims.14 In this alternate reality, those who had selected the car 
for its environmental friendliness and for whom the prospect of driving a 
dirty car—even a legally dirty car—is morally abhorrent would have been 
under-compensated. Second, absent illegality, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) would not have become involved in the litigation and would 
not have required VW to place billions of dollars into a climate fund to 
offset the excess emissions produced by Dieselgate.15 Yet reparatory 
                                                 
9. Dadush, Identity Harm, supra note 1, at 888–915. 
10. Guilbert Gates et al., How Volkswagen’s ‘Defeat Devices’ Worked, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/business/international/vw-diesel-emissions-scandal-
explained.html?mcubz=0&_r=0; VW Scandal: Company Warned over Test Cheating Years Ago, BBC 
(Sept. 27, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34373637 [https://perma.cc/2NLB-NKWD]. 
11. Nemet v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., No. 3:17-cv-04372 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2017); Class 
Action Complaint at 2, Nemet v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., No. 3:17-cv-04372 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 
2017) [hereinafter Nemet Complaint] (representing the “tens of thousands” of dirty-diesel owners who, 
because they sold their cars before VW’s deception was exposed, received nothing from the settlement). 
12. Dadush, Identity Harm, supra note 1, at 919–25. 
13. Jacob Bogage, Volkswagen Agrees to Pay Consumers Biggest Auto Settlement in History, 
WASH. POST (June 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/06/27/volks 
wagen-agrees-to-pay-consumers-biggest-auto-settlement-in-history/.  
14. With no environmental illegality, the cars’ market value would likely have diminished only 
by the amount of the clean premium, meaning the dollar difference between a conventional and a clean 
diesel car. See discussion infra Part V.  














remedies are key for addressing the grievances of identity-harmed 
consumers as they redress the injuries (to planet or people) enabled by an 
unvirtuous-in-fact purchase. Otherwise put, reparatory remedies are 
necessary for undoing a consumer’s unwitting participation in an abusive 
scheme. Without them, it becomes very difficult to restore a consumer’s 
values-integrity, which is crucial for addressing identity harm.  
Other recent identity harm cases concern labor abuses in global supply 
chains. These cases protested the use of forced child labor in the chocolate 
supply chain and of adult slaves in the frozen seafood and pet food supply 
chains.16 In class actions brought against each of Mars,17 Nestlé,18 and 
Hershey19 (collectively, the Chocolate Cases), the plaintiffs brought claims 
under state consumer laws arguing that they would not have bought the 
chocolate had they known it was made with forced child labor because they 
did not want to support abusive practices.20 In Sud v. Costco Wholesale 
Corp., the wholesaler was sued for inducing consumers to buy its frozen 
prawns when it knew its supply chain was contaminated by “slavery, human 
trafficking and other illegal labor abuses.”21 So far, none of these cases have 
been successful. 
Importantly, in Sud and in the Chocolate Cases, the companies had made 
various public statements, including in their CSR reports, supplier codes of 
conduct, and disclosures on their website affirming firm-wide commitment 
to eradicating labor and human rights abuses in their supply chains.22 I argue 
that although such statements are not displayed directly on product 
packaging, they nevertheless generate loud “sustainability noise” that lulls 
consumers into a false sense of comfort that they are buying sustainably, 
even if the reality is vastly different.23 Moreover, companies strategically 
surround-sound themselves in sustainability noise to attract and retain 
                                                 
16. See, e.g., Sud v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 229 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Dana v. 
Hershey Co., 180 F. Supp. 3d 652 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (N.D. 
Cal. 2016); McCoy v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 954 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Wirth v. Mars Inc., No. 
SA CV 15-1470-DOC (KESx), 2016 WL 471234 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016). 
17. Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1016. 
18. McCoy, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 954. 
19. Dana, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 652. 
20. See, e.g., Complaint for Violation of California Consumer Protection Laws at 1, Dana, 180 
F. Supp. 3d at 652 (No. 3:15-cv-04453) (“[W]hen . . . food companies fail to disclose the use of child 
and slave labor in their supply chains to consumers, they are deceived into buying products they would 
not have otherwise and thereby unwittingly supporting child and slave labor themselves through their 
product purchases.”). 
21. Sud Complaint, supra note 3, at 1–2.  
22. Id. at 4–5; Dana, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 655; Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1020; McCoy, 173 F. 
Supp. 3d at 956–57. 
23. Dadush, Identity Harm, supra note 1, at 900–08. 
 











customers, but also to shield themselves from liability. And so far, this 
strategy has been successful: the Sud and Chocolate Cases plaintiffs all 
failed because they could not establish that the companies had a duty to 
disclose that their products are sourced through tainted supply chains.24 
These cases offer a few examples of how identity harm is inadequately 
recognized and addressed by the courts. That these claims are being litigated 
demonstrates that identity harm is real, that consumers care about the social 
and environmental effects of their purchases, and that they want TNCs to 
improve their sustainability performance. Yet consumers are failing because 
of under-protective interpretations and applications of tort, contract, and 
state consumer law. Identity harm can help equip consumers to wage these 
legal battles more effectively.  
This Article develops identity harm as a legal tool for enhancing the 
protection of consumers’ other-regarding expectations and improving the 
sustainability performance of TNCs. Part I explains the rise of virtuous 
expectations against the backdrop of an ever-more intertwined relationship 
between consumption and citizenship. It argues for a fuller recognition of 
consumers as co-regulators of corporations’ sustainability performance and 
advocates for erring on the side of over-protecting consumers’ virtuous 
expectations. Part II isolates the “psychic safety defect” of identity-harming 
products and proposes situating identity harm among other intangible harms 
recognized in tort, specifically by treating it as a modern-day equivalent of 
defamation. Part III explains how contract law, the “law of broken 
promises,” can and should be adapted to enforce broken virtuous promises, 
specifically by making actionable the social and environmental claims that 
are shrouded in sustainability noise. Part IV proposes operationalizing 
identity harm through upgraded interpretation and application of state 
consumer law statutes. It focuses on California as the identity harm 
“laboratory state” because that state has yielded the most significant identity 
harm cases to date. Lastly, Part V explains why money damages are 
inadequate for making identity-harmed consumers whole and offers 
examples of reparatory remedies that would be far more effective for 
undoing the harm-in-the-world caused by virtuous dupery and for restoring 
consumers’ values-integrity.  
                                                 
24. Sud v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 229 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1087, 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2017) 
(concluding that, because there was no safety risk to consumers, Costco had no duty to disclose omitted 
information on its packaging, and therefore, that plaintiff failed to state a claim); Dana, 180 F. Supp. 3d 
at 668–69 (holding that an omission of material facts does not violate California’s False Advertising 
Law unless the company has exclusive control over the information); Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1027 
(“Such information is, in fact, readily available to consumers on Mars’s website.”); McCoy, 173 F. Supp. 
3d at 968 (“declin[ing] to make [the] leap” to establish that failure to disclose bad labor practices on a 













I. WHY IDENTITY HARM MATTERS 
This Part situates identity harm as a byproduct of the ever-more 
intertwined relationship between consumption and citizenship. It explains 
how consumption is, perhaps today more than ever, a central vehicle for the 
expression of civic, political, and personal values. In a political climate that 
is more protective of business interests than consumer interests and in which 
anti-regulation sentiments run high, it is becoming urgent to equip 
consumers with better tools for protecting their own interests, especially 
when those interests are bound up in the well-being of others. This Part 
responds to some of the challenges levelled against identity harm while 
explaining why this new concept offers a promising avenue for moving 
forward. 
A. Consumer Identity(ies)  
For some, identity harm is a problematic term. At the outset, though it 
may sound like identity theft, identity harm bears no relation to that concept. 
Identity harm refers to a deeper notion of identity than the data-based 
identity theft, which is focused on a person’s private identifying 
information, such as social security numbers, bank account information, 
credit card numbers, and contacts information. By contrast, the type of 
identity involved with identity harm relates to our sense of ourselves as 
beings who interact in the world, with other humans and other species, often 
across great distances and only indirectly, in near-total anonymity. In this 
setting, identity refers not to personal information, but rather to personal 
values, to our rules of spiritual, social, ethical, and environmental 
engagement. Identity harm does not occur through theft but rather through 
a virtuous perversion that makes us break our rules of engagement with the 
world and act against our values. The type of disappointment that 
accompanies identity harm can arise in any number of settings; however, 
for purposes of this project, identity harm is cabined to the transactional 
realm and, more specifically, to the realm of consumer transactions.  
Some readers may find the notion that an individual’s identity is 
intertwined with her consumption habits to be distasteful, reductive, or 
counterintuitive. Yet, for better or worse, especially in richer countries, 
much of our identity is wrapped up in the question of what and how we 
choose to consume.25 Indeed, consumers are not merely “economic beings” 
                                                 
25. Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 1758 (2003) 
[hereinafter Kysar, Expectations of Consumers] (In a globalized world where “much of productive labor 
 











fulfilling utilitarian needs in the marketplace.26 When an individual walks 
into a (physical or virtual) shop, she does not check her personality or 
humanness at the door, nor does she become a mindless utility-maximizing 
machine. Rather, she remains a textured, nuanced human who carries with 
her all kinds of preferences and values and history that come to bear on her 
purchasing decisions. These same preferences, values, and histories are the 
subject of much targeting by marketing and advertising. Likewise, 
consumer goods are more than mere “vehicles for satisfying individual, 
unspecified desires”27 as they too carry a history, this time a history of 
production and marketing.28  
Douglas Kysar describes consumer habits as “the product of an ongoing 
dialogue between and among consumers and the multitude of manufacturers 
and other entities who have an interest in helping to shape the identities and 
aspirations signified by particular modes of consumption.”29 He views 
consumption not as a neutral, needs-driven exchange, but rather as a “messy 
communicative act that combines pleasure seeking with elements of self-
definition and social expression.”30 Our individual consumption habits 
therefore provide a source of self-identification within what can seem like 
a frighteningly impersonal marketplace. On this view, consumer habits 
reveal “an insatiable desire, not for objects, but for the meanings, 
implications, and values that objects import.”31 This perspective offers a 
rich account of consumer identity(ies), where individuals develop as 
individuals in part through their consumption choices. It also sets the stage 
for understanding the dual rise of the “heroic consumer”32 and conscious 
consumerism.  
As Kysar observes, American consumers are increasingly expected to be 
heroic, to be good patriots who sustain the economy with their purchases 
and good citizens who vote with their purchasing dollars in favor of—or 
against—market behaviors that they view as good or bad.33 Consumers are 
                                                 
has become anonymous and devoid of distinction,” individuals have come to “define their values, 
aspirations, and identities by reference to the goods they consume, the leisure activities they undertake, 
and the locations which they travel.”).  
26. Id. at 1757. 
27. Id. 
28. As Eric Freyfogle expresses, “To buy a product is inevitably to become tied to its history and 
to accept a level of responsibility for its future.” Kysar, Preferences for Processes, supra note 8, at 617 
(quoting ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON GOOD 194 
(2003)). 
29. Kysar, Expectations of Consumers, supra note 25, at 1759. 
30. Id. at 1757. 
31. Id.  
32. Kysar, Preferences for Processes, supra note 8, at 533.  














thus expected to spend money in order to grease the wheels of commerce, 
but also to assume a share of government’s norm-setting and regulatory 
functions.34 Such heroism is readily observed in the sustainability context 
where consumers play an important part in normalizing, monitoring, and 
enforcing environmental and labor standards by engaging in boycotts, 
buycotts, naming and shaming, and by bringing legal claims.35 Consumers 
who activate this way are described as “citizen-consumers,”36 engaged in 
what Vogel calls “civil regulation.”37 Civil regulation is distinct from—and 
pursued in response to the shortfalls of—public or official market 
regulation.38 It is a form of global governance that draws its power and 
legitimacy not from government but from civil society, in particular from 
public interest-focused non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
consumer groups.39 A central argument in this Article is that consumers 
should be better equipped to serve as civil regulators through enhanced legal 
protection of their virtuous expectations from exploitation.40  
                                                 
34. Id. at 636 (“Because consumption is now a principal vehicle by which individuals are 
connected to a globalized world that includes social injustice and ecological fragility, it is also through 
consumption that those individuals’ hesitancies and objections are becoming most apparent.”); id. at 619 
(“[P]roponents of cost-benefit analysis are urging regulators to rely on individual market behavior in 
order to infer the determinants of public policy.”) 
35. Vogel, Private Regulation of Corporate Conduct, supra note 4, at 76–78 (explaining that 
most civil regulations began as citizen campaigns directed against companies or industries around 
working conditions and wages, child labor, and unsustainable forestry practices, and describing naming 
and shaming campaigns and boycotts as civil regulatory strategies); Anand Ghiridharadas, Boycotts 
Minus the Pain, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/11/weekinreview/11gir 
idharadas.html (“Political consumption is not new . . . . What is new is that boycotting is surrendering 
to buycotting, the sending of positive, not just negative, signals; and that it is practiced increasingly by 
mainstream shoppers, not just die-hard activists.”).  
36. Josée Johnston, The Citizen-Consumer Hybrid: Ideological Tensions and 
the Case of Whole Foods Market, 37 THEORY & SOC’Y 229, 232 (2008) (unpacking the concept of the 
“citizen-consumer” as “a social practice” that can theoretically “satisfy competing ideologies of 
consumerism (an ideal rooted in individual self-interest) and citizenship (an ideal rooted in collective 
responsibility to a social and ecological commons).”). 
37. See Vogel, Private Regulation of Corporate Conduct supra note 4, at 69 (“Civil regulations 
employ private, nonstate, or market-based regulatory frameworks to govern multinational firms and 
global supply networks. A defining feature of civil regulations is that their legitimacy, governance, and 
implementation is not rooted in public authority.”). Vogel explains that globalization has “undermined 
both the willingness and capacity of governments to make global firms politically accountable” and that 
civil regulation serves to fill the “governance deficit.” Id. at 73, 80. 
38. Id. at 80. 
39. Id. at 77–78.  
40. In a recent paper, Kevin Kolben develops the idea of the “consumer imaginary” or the 
narratives that consumers develop about the social origins of products to “narrow the social distance” 
between themselves and producers; he describes the consumer imaginary as an underutilized tool for 
governing global supply chains and proposes avenues for activating it. Kevin Kolben, Consumer 
Citizenship and the Consumer Imaginary (Feb. 5, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
Operationalizing identity harm would advance this project by making TNCs liable for exploiting 
consumer imaginaries.   
 











Conscious consumerism is an important component of civil regulation. 
Kysar identifies three accounts that explain consumers’ deepening interest 
in the social-environmental dimensions of their purchases: the 
“instrumental account,” the “expressive account,” and the “ethical account.” 
The first stipulates that, when consumers demand goods that they believe to 
have been manufactured without causing harm to workers, animals, or the 
environment, they are seeking to “improve the welfare of individual 
producers or otherwise influence manufacturing processes.”41 Here, the 
utility derived from conscious consumption is achieved through a belief that 
one is, even in a small way, effecting positive change in the world.42  
The expressive account begins from the observation that consumers are 
willing to pay more for sustainable goods, even if these goods are identical 
to their conventional counterparts in terms of physical, safety, and 
performance-related characteristics.43 This account suggests that consumers 
view their purchasing decisions as a chance to express their values and 
political views, to participate in a process “whereby one is able to express 
a ‘vote’ in favor of . . . change, whether or not it actually occurs.”44 Here, 
the “demand for process-labeled goods reflects in part the value that 
individuals place on the ability to express their moral and political views.”45 
Kysar suggests that, for some, conscious consumption could actually offer 
a better outlet for engaging in public debate than traditional modes of 
political participation, such as voting: “[I]n coming years, rising levels of 
affluence, combined with the continued overshadowing of civic life by 
market life, may lead individuals to view purposeful consumption as their 
surest, if not their only, means for public expression and engagement.”46   
                                                 
41. Kysar, Preferences for Processes, supra note 8, at 604. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id.  
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 533 (footnote omitted); id. at 535 (“[I]ndividuals may well come to view such [process] 
preferences as their most appropriate mechanism for influencing the policies and conditions of a 
globalized world.”). Kysar does not celebrate market-primacy; rather, he considers the normative 
implications of market-primacy for consumers, manufacturers, and policy makers. Commentators such 
as Anand Ghiridharadas express the concern that this trend could go too far, with consumer activism 
supplanting political activism, neglecting traditional fora for expressing civic values and replacing the 
collective-interest-focused ideal of democratic participation with the self-interested ideal of consumer 
choice. Ghiridharadas, supra note 35. Shopping to “refine the world” could also lessen the pressure on 
government to do its job: “Public goods like health systems should be publicly provided, [critics] say. If 
organic vegetables are better, then we should all eat them, instead of just the elite. And privatizing 
compassion may tempt the state to neglect problems; then, when a recession slows shopping, AIDS 
orphans languish waiting for you to buy sunglasses.” Id. Ghiridharadas asks whether consumption is “an 
exciting new form of citizenship? Or . . . a sign of how corroded citizenship has become that shopping 
is the closest many of us are willing to come to worrying about labor laws, trade agreements, agricultural 














With the ethical account, Kysar identifies consumers’ preferences for 
avoiding products that they associate with immoral practices.47 Here, 
conscious consumers “accept that their actions . . . can exert only limited 
influence in a world of six billion [7.6 billion in 2018] individuals, but 
nevertheless seek resigned solace in the knowledge that they are not 
complicit with practices that they regard as immoral.”48 The ethical account 
is different from the other two in that it embodies a negative, “do no harm” 
principle, rather than a positive, “do good” principle. It recognizes the 
limited powers of individual consumers to influence the market, but also the 
importance of individuals’ autonomy to choose not to be complicit in bad 
practices.49 On this account, consumer utility is derived from stepping 
outside the zone of complicity50 and into a curated space where the 
consumer is (perhaps) shielded from aspects of global production that she 
finds morally problematic.  
Each of these accounts highlights important protection-worthy consumer 
interests, interests that are deeply personal and that reach our sense of 
dignity and virtue. These interests go to the heart of identity harm: the desire 
to approach consumption as an opportunity to effect change and make the 
world a better, safer place for generations to come; the desire to merge the 
personal (shopping, something we do almost every day) and the political 
(voting, something we do only occasionally) by engaging in consumerism 
as one would a formal political process, using it as a platform to express 
one’s views on matters of public concern such as labor rights and 
environmental protection; and, lastly, the desire to do no harm, to avoid 
purchases that would make us complicit in hurting others. Each of these 
accounts reveals different shades of identity harm, the short version of 
                                                 
As Vogel and others argue, however, consumer and political citizenship can be complements rather 
than substitutes. Vogel, Private Regulation of Corporate Conduct, supra note 4, at 76–78; Sarah Dadush, 
Profiting in (RED): The Need for Enhanced Transparency in Cause-Related Marketing, 42 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 1269, 1303–10 (2010) (discussing the potential for consumer citizenship to improve the 
world). For Jeremy Youde, conscious consumerism affords an opportunity to express values that 
consumers may not be able to express politically: “Citizens may not have the time, energy, or skills 
necessary to engage in . . . lobbying and more overt political actions. However, nearly everyone goes 
shopping.” Jeremy Youde, Ethical Consumerism or Reified Neoliberalism? Product (RED) and Private 
Funding for Public Goods, 31 NEW POL. SCI. 201, 215 (2009).  
47. Id. at 615–24. 
48. Id. at 616 (citing Robert Howse & Donald Regan, The Product/Process Distinction—An 
Illusory Basis for Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 249, 275 (2000) 
(“Some people do not want to benefit from or be associated with what they regard as wickedness even 
if they are unable to prevent it.”). 
49. Id. at 615–24. 
50. This phrase adapts the tort law concept, “zone of danger,” which refers to situations where 
someone experiences fear of injury. Robert L. Rabin, Intangible Damages in American Tort Law: A 
Roadmap, 14 (Stanford Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 2727885, 2016), http://papers.ss 
rn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2727885. 











which is, “I believed I was being good when in fact I was being bad.” 
Together, they reveal how much is at stake with protecting consumers’ 
virtuous expectations and their autonomy to make values-aligned choices. 
B. Over-Protection Versus Under-Protection 
Some may hold the view that individual consumption habits say less 
about who we want to be in the world than who we want other people to 
think we are. From this perspective, identity harm is rooted in a shallow 
sense of identity that is not protection-worthy as it revolves only around 
personal image, not personal values. Thus, if someone learns that a purchase 
they had believed to be virtuous was in fact unvirtuous (e.g., harmful to 
people or the planet), it is not their identity that is harmed, but rather their 
image, their personal brand. This view presumes that individuals who invest 
in burnishing their conscious consumer brand would not experience real 
disappointment upon discovering that their investment had actually 
produced a negative virtuous return. But it is easy to see how these 
individuals could experience identity harm, too. Imagine someone who 
purchased a VW clean diesel as a status symbol intended primarily to signal 
to the world that they are a good person who cares about the environment—
even if they don’t really care; upon learning the truth about the cars, that 
individual could well feel that their identity as “good” has been grossly 
undermined, even if goodness was not their true (or sole) motivation.  
This example illustrates how identity harm can arise regardless of the 
purity of consumers’ motivations. As such, it is not necessary, practical, or 
desirable to exclude image-centric (versus values-centric) claims from the 
identity harm umbrella. That said, it is important to distinguish between fake 
and sincere identity harm claims for liability purposes.51 Indeed, if it comes 
to serve as a basis for liability, identity harm could be exploited by 
opportunistic claimants to obtain compensation, even if they were not 
harmed by a broken virtuous promise. That would be problematic. As 
discussed in Part V, however, sincerity should be evaluated for purposes of 
assessing remedies, rather than the validity of the claim. At the claim-
making stage, my view is that the risk of over-protecting opportunistic 
claimants is less concerning than under-protecting sincere claimants who 
experienced identity harm.  
There are at least three reasons to err on the side of more rather than less 
protection for consumers’ other-regarding, sustainability-related 
                                                 
51. Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, The Restoration Remedy in Private Law, 118 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1901 (2018) (developing an innovative model for remedying emotional harms through a 














expectations—even accounting for the risk of insincerity. First, it would 
help to advance the achievement of sustainability commitments that are 
beneficial to global society, such as the Sustainable Development Goals.52 
This is especially important at a time when the United States has, to the 
dismay of many, opted to withdraw from sustainability initiatives, such as 
the Paris Agreement on Climate Change.53 Thickening the legal protections 
for individuals who buy (or are interested in buying) sustainably would 
empower consumers to serve more effectively as change agents and to 
counter some of government’s more regressive maneuvers. Otherwise 
stated, as the public hand of sustainability regulation weakens, it is 
becoming increasingly vital to bring more (even insincere) private hands 
onto the sustainability deck.54  
                                                 
52. The seventeen Sustainable Development Goals, including “Decent Work and Economic 
Growth,” “Responsible Consumption and Production,” and “Climate Action” are supported by the 
United States, United States Agency for International Development. Sustainable Development, USAID, 
https://www.usaid.gov/GlobalGoals [https://perma.cc/89GW-4R8V]; About the Sustainable 
Development Goals, U.N., https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/ 
[https://perma.cc/J5C8-3K6Y]. 
53. Camila Domonoske & Colin Dwyer, Trump Announces U.S. Withdrawal from Paris Climate 
Accord, NPR (June 1, 2017, 10:54 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/06/01/5307488 
99/watch-live-trump-announces-decision-on-paris-climate-agreement [https://perma.cc/4R3B-KFF8] 
(“A wide chorus of voices had called for Trump to recommit to the Paris agreement: other world leaders 
and hundreds of scientists, of course, but also CEOs of major energy companies and other big U.S. 
corporations.”); Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. from Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.ht 
ml; The Paris Agreement, U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php 
[https://perma.cc/G5JX-GR3B] (“The Paris Agreement[’s] central aim is to strengthen the global 
response to the threat of climate change by keeping a global temperature rise this century well below 2 
degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even 
further to 1.5 degrees Celsius.”). 
54. The lacuna of national and international law for regulating TNC behavior is well known, 
particularly with respect to sustainability. Under U.S. law, plaintiffs seeking to bring foreign 
corporations (or their subsidiaries) into court face increasingly difficult jurisdictional challenges. 
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 142 (2014) (holding that there was no personal jurisdiction over 
a foreign subsidiary that caused injuries outside of the country); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 
564 U.S. 873, 887 (2011) (finding no personal jurisdiction in a products liability case where a foreign 
manufacturer’s machine injured someone in New Jersey). Additionally, with the revival of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, we have witnessed the near-total evisceration of the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS) as a tool for holding human rights violators (public or private) accountable for actions 
overseas. Beth Stephens, The Curious History of the Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1467, 
1474 (2014); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 119 (2013) (holding that Nigerian 
nationals could not sue foreign corporations under the ATS because Congress did not intend to provide 
a cause of action for conduct occurring in foreign nations).  
Furthermore, efforts to negotiate a binding international treaty to increase nation states’ 
responsibility for their corporations’ human rights performance are compromised. See Beth Stephens, 
Making Remedies Work: Envisioning a Treaty-Based System of Effective Remedies, in BUILDING A 
TREATY ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 408, 409 (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 2017) (“The 
UN Human Rights Council decision in 2014 to begin discussion of a legally binding instrument 
governing [business and human rights] offers an opportunity to envision a system that could actually 
 











A second reason to err on the side of over-protection is that the 
alternative breeds distrust in the marketplace, in particular within the market 
for virtue, which is bad for business and for sustainability.55 Intuitively, the 
less confidence consumers have that their sustainable choices will be 
protected through enforcement of companies’ virtuous promises and 
accountability for promise breakers, the less likely they will be to make such 
choices; conversely, the more confidence consumers have that their choices 
will be protected, the more likely they will be to make—and pay premiums 
                                                 
offer effective remedies for corporate human rights violations. . . . Neither corporations nor states have 
demonstrated any interest in such radical change. Widespread ratification and enforcement . . . . would 
require a political will that seems nowhere in evidence at the moment.”). And international bodies tasked 
with protecting labor rights lack the legislative or adjudicatory powers to do so. BOB HEPPLE, LABOUR 
LAWS AND GLOBAL TRADE 25–67 (2005) (noting that UN organizations like the International Labor 
Organization have almost no enforcement power). 
Mandated disclosure initiatives embodied in the Dodd-Frank Conflict Minerals provisions, Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 
2213 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)), and the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, 
S.B. 657, 2009-10 Reg. Sess., § 3, (Cal. 2010) ask companies only to disclose information about their 
supply chains, such as whether they have a process in place for conducting human rights due diligence, 
not to meet minimum human rights standards or disclose whether abuses exist. Adam S. Chilton & Galit 
A. Sarfaty, The Limitations of Supply Chain Disclosure Regimes, 53 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 10 (2017) 
(“[I]nternational law is currently an ineffective mechanism for regulating corporate human rights abuses 
abroad. Existing standards have the status of voluntary soft law and lack independent monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms.”). 
Regarding environmental regulation, the EPA under the Trump presidency has adopted an anti-
regulation stance and rolled back regulations instituted by President Obama. Michael Greshko et al., A 
Running List of How President Trump Is Changing Environmental Policy, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, https://n 
ews.nationalgeographic.com/2017/03/how-trump-is-changing-science-environment/ [https://perma.cc/ 
QM38-9PNL] (last updated Oct. 1, 2018) (“Many of the [Trump Administration’s] actions roll back 
Obama-era policies that aimed to curb climate change and limit environmental pollution, while others 
threaten to limit federal funding for science and the environment.”); Nadja Popovich et al., 76 
Environmental Rules on the Way out Under Trump, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2017/10/05/climate/trump-environment-rules-reversed.html (last updated July 6, 2018). The Trump 
Administration’s regressive policy decisions include proposing cuts to clean energy programs, loosening 
regulations on toxic air pollution, and dropping climate change from the list of national security threats. 
Greshko et al., supra; Brady Dennis, Trump Budget Seeks 23 Percent Cut at EPA, Eliminating Dozens 
of Programs, WASH. POST (Feb. 12 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environme 
nt/wp/2018/02/12/trump-budget-seeks-23-percent-cut-at-epa-would-eliminate-dozens-of-programs/?ut 
m_term=.605ad2ece8db (“The White House is seeking to cut more than $2.5 billion from the annual 
budget of the Environmental Protection Agency—an overall reduction of more than 23 percent.”). The 
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement further evidences the demotion of environmental concerns at the 
federal level. Domonoske & Dwyer, supra note 53.  
Lastly, regulatory agencies that could require social or environmental labeling for U.S. consumer 
goods have their hands tied because of challenges from industry, combined with international trade law 
restrictions that limit nation states’ autonomy to implement regulations that could be “veiled barriers to 
trade.” Moody, supra note 4, at 1415.  
55. FTC Cracks Down on Misleading and Unsubstantiated Environmental Marketing Claims, 
FED. TRADE COMM’N (Oct. 29, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/10/ftc-crac 
ks-down-misleading-unsubstantiated-environmental [https://perma.cc/4K94-XLCN] (“[C]onsumers 
want products that are environmentally friendly, and . . . companies are trying to meet that need . . . . 
But companies that don’t have evidence to support the environmental claims they make about their 














for—them. Kysar describes the problem of consumer distrust while at the 
same time offering a compelling response to the challenge that more 
policing of “process representations”56 would chill TNCs’ sustainability 
commitments:  
This chilling argument . . . must be weighed against the 
complementary chilling of consumer demand that would occur if 
individuals no longer could depend on the veracity of process 
representations in a heavily manipulated marketplace. If individuals 
came to regard the process representations of manufacturers with 
substantial cynicism and distrust, such that their willingness to pay 
premiums for process-labeled goods diminished, then the economic 
motivation for manufacturers . . . to disclose process information 
would diminish as well. In that sense, it is not merely a question 
whether the threat of deceptive advertising liability would deter 
manufacturer disclosure of process information, but whether the 
threat of liability would have a more pronounced effect than the 
drying-up of consumer demand that would be wrought by a 
marketplace rife with false and deceptive process claims.57  
Third, the data on conscious consumption indicates that a growing 
number of people, in particular millennials, are ready to pay more for 
products that they believe to be socially and/or environmentally sustainable 
(in their production and use).58 Increased willingness to pay premiums for 
                                                 
56. Kysar uses “process representations” and “process information” to describe information 
pertaining to “the labor conditions of workers who produce a consumer good, the environmental effects 
of a good’s production, the use of controversial engineering techniques such as genetic modification to 
create a good, or any number of other social, economic, or environmental circumstances that are related 
causally to a consumer product, but that do not necessarily manifest themselves in the product itself.” 
Kysar, Preferences for Processes, supra note 8, at 529. He clarifies that “although such factors generally 
do not bear on the functioning, performance, or safety of the product, they nevertheless can, and often 
do, influence the willingness of consumers to purchase the product.” Id. 
57. Id. at 613–14 (footnote omitted). 
58. See supra note 3; see also RAPHAEL BEMPORAD & MITCH BARANOWSKI, BBMG, 
CONSCIOUS CONSUMERS ARE CHANGING THE RULES OF MARKETING. ARE YOU READY? (2007), 
https://www.fmi.org/docs/sustainability/BBMG_Conscious_Consumer_White_Paper.pdf [https://perm 
a.cc/HWJ9-DEFK] (“[N]early nine in ten Americans say the words ‘conscious consumer’ describe them 
well and are more likely to buy from companies that manufacture energy efficient products (90%), 
promote health and safety benefits (88%), support fair labor and trade practices (87%) and commit to 
environmentally-friendly practices (87%), if products are of equal quality and price.”); Sarah Landrum, 
Millennials Driving Brands to Practice Socially Responsible Marketing, FORBES (Mar. 17, 2017) 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahlandrum/2017/03/17/millennials-driving-brands-to-practice-social 
ly-responsible-marketing/#675196194990 [https://perma.cc/J2D9-CWGR] (explaining that 
“[m]illennials prefer to do business with corporations and brands with pro-social messages, sustainable 
manufacturing methods and ethical business standards” and that while “66% of consumers are willing 
 











otherwise equivalent products indicates a readiness to sacrifice financially 
in order to avoid sacrificing morally.59 That consumers increasingly seek 
out sustainable brands and products is reflected in the vastly increased 
supply of sustainable goods that are now available for purchase.60 The last 
fifteen years have seen a remarkable rise in the quantity and variety of 
sustainable consumer goods,61 and in the use of product labels that attest to 
the goods’ sustainability-related virtues.62 All of this suggests that 
sustainability is big business, one that rides on the coattails of protection-
worthy consumer expectations. 
For better or worse, we live in a consumerist society that reproduces and 
constantly creates new “schemes of want.”63 With few exceptions,64 the 
message to consumers is not “buy less”; it is always “buy more, and buy 
more of this.” In this wants-making machine, there is too much room for 
sellers to exploit consumers’ virtuous expectations with exaggerated, false, 
                                                 
to spend more on a product if it comes from a sustainable brand,” millennials “gave an even more 
impressive showing, with 73%”). 
59. Kimberly Ann Elliott & Richard B. Freeman, White Hats or Don Quixotes? Human Rights 
Vigilantes in the Global Economy, in EMERGING LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 47, 51 (Richard B. Freeman et al. eds., 2005) (finding consumers would pay 28% more 
for a $10 ethical good and 15% more for a $100 ethical good); Patrick De Pelsmacker et al., Do 
Consumers Care About Ethics? Willingness to Pay For Fair-Trade Coffee, 39 J. CONSUMER AFF. 363 
(2005) (finding consumer willingness to pay a 10% premium for fair trade goods). 
60. Our Takeaway from Natural Products Expo West 2017: The Rise of “Edible Ethics,” 
HARTMAN GRP. (May 2, 2017) https://www.hartman-group.com/hartbeat/693/our-takeaway-from-natur 
al-products-expo-west-2017-the-rise-of-edible-ethics- [https://perma.cc/49ZY-5UHP] [hereinafter The 
Rise of “Edible Ethics”] (“[P]roducts (and the companies that produce them) are increasingly under a 
spotlight that values transparency, clean ingredients and convincing narratives of production — all 
reflecting . . . a rising interest in . . . ‘edible ethics.’”); Unilever’s Sustainable Living Brands Continue 
to Drive Higher Rates of Growth, UNILEVER (May 18, 2017), https://www.unilever.com/news/Press-rel 
eases/2017/unilevers-sustainable-living-brands-continue-to-drive-higher-rates-of-growth.html [https:// 
perma.cc/43R8-U88V] (“Unilever’s brands continue to lead the way on sustainable living.”). 
61. See FAIRTRADE INT’L, SCOPE AND BENEFITS OF FAIRTRADE 8, 37 (7th ed. 2015), https:// 
www.fairtrade.net/impact-research/monitoring-impact-reports.html [https://perma.cc/WT5W-CT87] 
(noting that by the end of 2014, 1,226 organizations in 74 countries had been Fairtrade certified, 
representing a 35% increase from 2010); Johnston, supra note 36, at 241 (explaining that “ethical 
consumer products, like fair-trade commodities, generate a price premium”); Steve Stecklow & Erin 
White, At Some Retailers, ‘Fair Trade’ Carries a Very High Cost, WALL ST. J. (June 8, 2004, 12:01 
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB108664921254731069 (“Supermarkets are taking advantage of 
the label to make more profit because they know that consumers are willing to pay a bit more because 
it’s fair trade.”). 
62. The Rise of “Edible Ethics,” supra note 60. 
63. EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 119–20 
(7th ed. 1956). 
64. Hunter Lovins & Colette Crouse, Don’t Buy This Jacket: Lessons in Successful Values 
Marketing, SUSTAINABLE BRANDS (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.sustainablebrands.com/news_and_ 
views/articles/dont-buy-jacket-lessons-successful-values-marketing [https://perma.cc/ZUH7-WU4T] 
(describing Patagonia’s “Buy Less Campaign” which included a full-page ad in the New York Times 
featuring the company’s best-selling jacket and instructed consumers, “Don’t buy this jacket” and 














or simply “noisy” representations about their wares. Furthermore, although 
they are at an informational deficit, consumers are expected to be heroic, to 
deploy their purchasing dollars to support the economy while at the same 
time communicating their views on public policy. This is a tall order. If 
consumers are to serve these heroic functions effectively, then their virtuous 
expectations must be better recognized and protected under the law. 
Building on Vogel and Kysar’s (amongst others’) insights about the under-
tapped potential of consumers to serve as civil regulators, this Article 
proposes identity harm as a new tool for consumer protection and consumer 
empowerment.  
II. THE PSYCHIC SAFETY DEFECT OF IDENTITY-HARMING PRODUCTS 
The notion of defect comes from tort law and, more specifically, from 
products liability law. This Part considers the possibilities for seeing and 
tackling identity harm through a torts lens. First, it describes the special type 
of intangible harm at issue with identity-harming products as a “psychic 
safety defect” and proposes expanding the notion of product dangerosity to 
include this defect.65 It then draws an analogy between identity harm and 
the dignitary tort of defamation and recommends understanding identity 
harm as a modern day incarnation of defamation, focused not on public 
reputation, but on one’s notion of oneself in the world. The objective is to 
lay the foundation for more vigorous regulation of companies’ virtuous 
promises via private consumer litigation.  
A. “Virtuous Dupery” and the Problem of Psychic Safety  
Identity harm is different from, say, the physical safety harm caused by 
a spontaneously combusting cell phone where the user is at risk of being 
physically injured.66 It can also be distinguished from the distress that 
consumers experience when they learn that the “100% natural” food they 
ingested in fact contains genetically modified organisms because these 
kinds of statements typically target consumers’ concerns about their own 
                                                 
65. I am grateful to Kevin Kolben for proposing this term. 
66. See Eun-Young Jeong, Samsung to Recall Galaxy Note 7 Smartphone over Reports of Fires, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 2, 2016, 5:35 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/samsung-to-recall-galaxy-note-7-
smartphone-1472805076; Daisuke Wakabayashi et al., Samsung Halts Galaxy Note 7 Production as 
Battery Problems Linger, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/11/business/s 
amsung-galaxy-note-fires.html?_r=0. 
 











bodily health, rather than their sense of virtue.67 In other words, with 
traditional safety defects, the primary injured or concerned-about-being-
injured party is the consumer herself. By contrast, with identity harm, the 
injury is derivative in the sense that it is at least one step removed from the 
transaction. The virtuous promises that underlie identity-harming 
transactions tap into something beyond the consumer and her immediate 
self-interest, reaching her values and rules of engagement with the world. 
As a result, when a virtuous promise is broken, the injury unfolds 
somewhere beyond the consumer.  
To illustrate, for virtuous duperies pertaining to sustainability, the 
physical injury is experienced not by the consumer but by the planet or the 
people involved in the production process.68 The harm experienced by the 
consumer is psychic, rather than physical. It arises upon realizing one’s 
unwitting participation in causing harm to another, of being made to act 
contrary to one’s personal values. A chocolate bar that a consumer learns 
was made with forced child labor likely tastes no less sweet on her tongue, 
even though its moral taint on her conscience may be very bitter indeed.69 
Similarly, a pricier item such as a diamond engagement ring that is 
discovered to have been sourced from a “blood diamond” country may still 
shine brightly, but its moral brilliance may be greatly diminished for its 
owner. Moral bitterness or dullness are by-products of the derivative 
characteristic of identity harm, of realizing that one’s purchase contributed 
to hurting others. Importantly, because it surfaces within the (noneconomic) 
moral sphere, the intensity of the harm is only loosely connected to product 
price. Identity harm is morally sensitive but price-neutral, in other words. 
                                                 
67. See Michele Simon, ConAgra Sued Over GMO ‘100% Natural’ Cooking Oils, FOOD SAFETY 
NEWS (Aug. 24. 2011), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2011/08/conagra-sued-over-gmo-100-natural-
cooking-oils/#.WKeHvRSnWto [https://perma.cc/VD8K-6QGV] (describing a class action against 
ConAgra for labeling cooking oils “100% natural” to target health conscious consumers when the oils 
contain GMOs). Note that consumers who seek out “natural” and “organic” may also be concerned with 
other-regarding sustainability issues, such as soil-health and water pollution. See Fairtrade and Organic 
Go Hand in Hand, FAIRTRADE AM. (Sept. 6, 2016), http://fairtradeamerica.org/Media-Center/Blog/20 
16/September/fairtrade-and-organic [https://perma.cc/PYJ4-NLXZ] (“Some [buy organic] for 
environmental concerns while others believe it is healthier”).  
68. From the corporate supply side, sustainable practices  
provide a benefit primarily to someone other than the firms’ patrons. Under this broad definition 
of altruism, all of these practices constitute the provision of altruism to such patrons. In that 
sense, commercial nonprofits and commercial for-profits are suppliers of altruism, even though 
they are primarily supported by fees paid by their customers. 
Benjamin Moses Leff, Some Implications of the Agency-Cost Theory of the Nonprofit Firm, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW 401 (Benjamin Means & Joseph W. Yockey eds., 
forthcoming Jan. 2019) (manuscript on file with author). 
69. Sud Complaint, supra note 3, at 1 (“[C]onsumers do not expect the products that they 
purchase to be derived from, manufactured or otherwise created or made available through the use of 














Within the sphere of broken sustainability promises, identity harm is 
experienced by the consumer but stems from injuries to others. Such injuries 
are supported by consumer purchases and can occur before the transaction, 
during production, or afterwards, when the product is used (e.g., driving the 
VW dirty-diesels). But identity harm can be triggered outside the 
sustainability sphere, as well. For example, it encompasses the type of 
“spiritual harm” that someone who observes the Jewish faith might 
experience upon learning that the food she ingested was falsely marketed as 
Kosher,70 or an observer of Islam might experience upon learning that a 
meat product she consumed was not in fact Halal, or someone of the Jain or 
Hindu traditions might experience upon learning that the food she ordered 
was incorrectly described as vegetarian.71 Here, the consumer suffers no 
direct physical harm as a result of the broken promise, but the integrity of 
her relationship to the divine may be undermined. In each instance, the 
consumer is in some way misled, pitted against her own religious values, 
and unwittingly made to break her own rules of engagement with the 
spiritual world.  
The “ethical harm” that a vegan consumer might experience upon 
learning that a product she believed to be cruelty-free was in fact developed 
by experimenting on animals can also be brought under the identity harm 
umbrella. Here, the consumer’s identity harm would be connected to the 
injury suffered, even only theoretically, by the animals.72 Yet another type 
of identity harm could be described as “patriotic harm,” referring to the 
psychic harm experienced by a consumer who purchases a product labeled 
“Made in the U.S.A.” only to learn that the product was made in Taiwan 
and assembled in Mexico, for example.73 Here, the consumer understood 
                                                 
70. See Stephen F. Rosenthal, Food for Thought: Kosher Fraud Laws and the Religion Clauses 
of the First Amendment, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 951, 956 n.43 (1997) (alteration in original) (quoting 
RABBI YACOV LIPSCHUTZ, KASHRUTH: A COMPREHENSIVE BACKGROUND AND REFERENCE GUIDE TO 
THE PRINCIPLES OF KASHRUTH 15 (1988)) (“[T]he consumption of forbidden foods defiles the holy 
spirit, and its sanctity is injured. This injury reduces the Jewish capacity to reap the full rewards of Torah 
and its fathomless depths.”). 
71. Gupta v. Asha Enters., 27 A.3d 953, 962–64 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (granting 
summary judgment in favor of a restaurant that erroneously served Hindu vegetarian patrons meat due 
to a lack of measurable damage for negligence claims, but denying the restaurant’s motion for summary 
judgment based on express warranty claims). Plaintiffs argued that they suffered “spiritual injuries” 
based on the Hindu belief that “if they eat meat, they become involved in the sinful cycle of inflicting 
pain, injury and death on God’s creatures, and that it affects the karma and dharma, or purity of the 
soul.” Id. at 956. 
72. Beltran v. Avon Products, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1073 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (class action 
claiming that if consumers had been aware that Avon tested on animals, they would not have purchased 
the company’s cosmetics). 
73. Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877, 881 (Cal. 2011) (finding that plaintiffs had 
suffered an injury in fact when they purchased locksets falsely marked as Made In U.S.A.). 
 











her purchase to be patriotic, a way to contribute to the U.S. economy and to 
the well-being of her fellow citizens.74 Realizing her mistake, she might be 
upset for economic reasons, since she was duped into parting with her 
money, but also for psychic and emotional reasons, because she unwittingly 
acted against her values by supporting the wrong economy.  
These examples of identity harm all highlight its derivative nature by 
illustrating how the underlying injury occurs beyond the transaction and the 
consumer. They show that identity harm is triggered when the integrity of a 
consumer’s relationship(s) to the world (e.g., social, environmental, 
spiritual, ethical, patriotic) is undermined. They further show that identity-
harming products are not defective in the traditional sense since they do not 
malfunction or put the consumer in physical danger. They do, however, 
possess a psychic safety defect: by undercutting an individual’s autonomy 
to make values-aligned purchasing decisions—indeed, by making her act 
against her values—identity-harming products cause a special type of 
psychic distress. The distress is arguably most acute when other-regarding 
virtuous promises are at issue since the latter implicate the consumer in the 
well-being or, more aptly, the ill-being of others—e.g., the planet and 
people making the product.  
B. Expanding Dangerosity  
The psychic safety defect possessed by identity-harming products can be 
compared to the defect contained in a predatory loan that endangers not only 
the financial safety of the borrower, but also her sense of well-being.75 
Indeed, recognizing the financially and psychically abusive features of 
certain financial products (e.g., payday loans and subprime mortgages) is 
what led to the establishment of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB) in order to better police financial products providers, particularly 
                                                 
74. Second Amended Class Action Complaint at 7, Oxina v. Lands’ End, Inc., No. 3:14-cv-2577-
MMA (NLS), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94847 (S.D. Cal. July 29, 2015) (“Plaintiff believed at the time 
she purchased . . . that she was purchasing a superior quality product, as well as supporting U.S. jobs 
and the U.S. economy.”); Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 132 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2009) (“It is an injury we fully comprehend and condole: their patriotic desire to buy fully American-
made products was frustrated.”), rev’d, 246 P.3d 881 (Cal. 2011). 
75. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2008) (“For 
families that get tangled up with truly dangerous financial products, the results can be wiped-out savings, 
lost homes, higher costs for car insurance, denial of jobs, troubled marriages, bleak retirements, and 
broken lives.”); Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, 5 DEMOCRACY (2007), http://democracyjo 
urnal.org/magazine/5/unsafe-at-any-rate/ [https://perma.cc/W932-DBE6] (explaining that the cost of 
debt cannot be measured only in dollars, and that “[a]nxiety and shame have become constant 














vis-à-vis financially vulnerable consumers.76 The CFPB was founded on an 
expanded definition of product dangerosity, as proposed by (now) Senator 
Elizabeth Warren, who famously bemoaned,  
It is impossible to buy a toaster that has a one-in-five chance of 
bursting into flames and burning down your house. But it is possible 
to refinance an existing home with a mortgage that has the same one-
in-five chance of putting the family out on the street—and the 
mortgage won’t even carry a disclosure of that fact to the 
homeowner.77  
This Section advocates for expanding dangerosity further to encompass the 
psychic safety issues created by identity-harming products. To be clear, the 
recommendation here is not to establish a new regulatory agency to deal 
with identity-harming goods and virtuous duperies, but rather to upgrade 
the legal tools we already have so that consumers can better fight their own 
legal battles. 
Knives, cars, guns, pharmaceuticals, cigarettes, alcohol: these are all 
inherently dangerous items in that there is only so much manufacturers can 
do to make them safe for use. Goods that qualify as inherently dangerous 
invite closer regulation through, for example, disclosure and license and age 
requirements. Armed with dangerosity information, consumers can (in 
theory) decide how much risk to expose themselves to. But many goods are 
not considered dangerous even if they are products of danger. As a result, 
many dangerous-in-fact goods circulate beneath the regulatory radar. For 
example, a bar of chocolate made with forced child labor would not be 
viewed as dangerous even though it is a product of danger. How else to 
qualify the trafficking and abuse of tens of thousands of West African 
children and the injuries they sustain while wielding machetes to pry open 
cacao pods?78 Or the deaths of thousands of women who have perished in 
                                                 
76. Creating the Consumer Bureau, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bu 
reau/creatingthebureau/ [https://perma.cc/U5EU-Z2N9] (noting that the CFPB was created to “address 
failures of consumer protection” because lenders were making bad loans and exploiting borrowers).  
77. Warren, supra note 75. See also Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 75, at 6 (arguing for tailored 
regulation of consumer financial products: “Credit products should be thought of as products, like 
toasters and lawnmowers, and their sale should meet minimum safety standards.”). 
78. TULANE UNIV. SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH & TROPICAL MED., 2013/14 SURVEY RESEARCH ON 
CHILD LABOR IN WEST AFRICAN COCOA GROWING AREAS 81 (2015), http://www.childlaborcocoa.org/ 
images/Payson_Reports/Tulane%20University%20-%20Survey%20Research%20on%20Child%20La
bor%20in%20the%20Cocoa%20Sector%20-%2030%20July%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/U66B-BN 
8J] (“In the aggregate more than 2 million children between 5–17 years are estimated to be in hazardous 
work in cocoa in 2013/14, an 18% increase compared to 2008/09. The goal of the Harkin-Engel 
Protocol—removing large numbers of children from the [Worst Forms of Child Labor] in West African 
cocoa agriculture—has yet to be reached.”); Alexandra Wexler, Chocolate Makers Fight a Melting 
 











factory fires and building collapses while making clothes for rich-country 
consumers?79 Or the illnesses and subsequent deaths of hundreds of cotton 
farmers in India due to the use of toxic pesticides that increase yields in 
order to meet the demands of the fast fashion industry?80 Or the countless 
animals that have suffered to develop cosmetics, or whose fertility has 
dropped because of water and soil pollution caused by pesticides and 
clothing dye?81  
Because manufacturers are only required to communicate safety 
information pertaining to consumers’ physical safety, not social or 
environmental dangerosity information, conscious consumers must actively 
hunt that information down. But hunting for information can be 
inconvenient, time consuming, costly, and not terribly rewarding. As things 
stand, then, consumers are over-exposed to psychic safety risks, and though 
many may believe that they have the autonomy to make informed, values-
aligned purchasing decisions, the reality is that this autonomy is severely 
undermined by the weak dangerosity-information systems at work. Once 
again we encounter the heroic consumer and find her to be spectacularly ill 
equipped to serve her heroic functions. For identity harm purposes, the 
question thus becomes, “Should consumers be expected to assume the risk 
that their consumptive desires are being met through practices that are 
abusive to humans, animals, and the planet?”  
In our increasingly globalized world, consumers can generally satisfy 
their desires without knowing much, if anything, about the production 
history of their purchases. The social bonds that tie us to one another across 
                                                 
Supply of Cocoa, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2016, 9:30 PM), https://www.cocoalife.org/~/media/CocoaLife/  
en/download//article/Wsj_Chocolate%20makers%20supply%20chain.pdf [https://perma.cc/68XM-W2 
WN] (hazardous conditions include using dangerous instruments like machetes, “clearing land, carrying 
heavy loads, or [working] for long hours, at night or with exposure to agrochemicals”). 
79. CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN ET AL., EVALUATION OF H&M COMPLIANCE WITH SAFETY 
ACTION PLANS FOR STRATEGIC SUPPLIERS IN BANGLADESH 1 (2015), https://cleanclothes.org/resources 
/publications/hm-bangladesh-september-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CUM-B4SE] (“[T]he Rana Plaza 
building collapsed, killing 1,138 garment workers and injuring 2,500 more. It was the deadliest disaster 
in the history of the global apparel industry.”); Bangladesh Factory Collapse Toll Passes 1,000, BBC 
NEWS (May 10, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-22476774 [https://perma.cc/SYV5-HWA 
4].  
80. Kate Good, How Pesticides Are Harming Animals, ONE GREEN PLANET (Mar. 20, 2014), 
http://www.onegreenplanet.org/animalsandnature/how-pesticides-are-harming-animals/ [https://perma. 
cc/DZF7-Z2ZX] (noting that pesticides disorient bees, cause sexual abnormalities in frogs, decrease 
reproductive rates in birds, and increase cancer risks in dogs and cats); Jaideep Hardikar, The Indian 
Farmers Falling Prey to Pesticide, BBC NEWS (Oct. 5, 2017) http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-in 
dia-41510730 [https://perma.cc/JR3L-YZMR]; Patsy Perry, The Environmental Costs of Fast Fashion, 
INDEPENDENT (Jan. 8, 2018), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/fashion/environment-costs-fast-
fashion-pollution-waste-sustainability-a8139386.html [https://perma.cc/X96E-8NHN].   
81. About Cosmetics Animal Testing, HUMANE SOC’Y INT’L, http://www.hsi.org/issues/becruelty 
free/facts/about_cosmetics_animal_testing.html [https://perma.cc/U87A-NMM4] (“[A]pproximately 














the globe are often obscured and anonymized by opaque supply chains; this 
allows for the perpetuation of a dynamic whereby rich-country consumers 
(unknowingly) contribute to the ill-being of poor-country producers and 
their communities. As Kysar urged over a decade ago, this disturbing state 
of affairs calls for revisiting the distinction between product safety and the 
safety of the production process.82 More specifically, it calls for formal 
consideration of social-environmental dangerosity when analyzing product 
safety. 
[T]he world of universal utilitarianism has not yet arrived. Until it 
does, products liability law need not further the erosion of citizen risk 
values by giving effect only to technical, sterilized expectations of 
safety. Rather, the common law of products liability should reflect 
the culture within which it operates, and it should do so by 
acknowledging lay risk values to the extent that, and so long as, they 
exist.83  
If products liability law is to serve as a “cultural mirror”84 that faithfully 
reflects societal notions of safety/dangerosity or “lay risk values,” then 
upgrades will be necessary. Safety analysis should look beyond the physical 
product to include the processes that made its making possible, as well as 
the environmental impact of its use. Such an upgrade would improve the 
responsiveness of products liability law to consumers’ evolving 
expectations and increase the relevance and effectiveness of this crucial 
branch of consumer protection.  
One shortcoming of products liability law is that defect claims are 
assessed by applying cost-utility analysis, where the risk created by product 
X is compared with that of an alternative design, without considering 
consumer expectations.85 Thus, under the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 
product risk is assessed “only in relation to alternative product designs,” and 
the “sphere of relevant variables becomes confined to expected harm, 
product functionality, and other manifest physical characteristics of the 
product and its proffered alternatives.”86 For example, a bullet that “severely 
                                                 
82. Kysar, Preferences for Processes, supra note 8. 
83. Kysar, Expectations of Consumers, supra note 25, at 1788 (footnote omitted). 
84. Id. at 1760 (citing Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALI 
Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631, 638, 664 (1995); Marshall S. Shapo, Products Liability: 
The Next Act, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 761, 771 (1998); and Marshall S. Shapo, In the Looking Glass: What 
Torts Scholarship Can Teach Us About the American Experience, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1567, 1577 
(1995)). 
85. Id. at 1766. 
86. Id.  
 











rip[s] through and mutilate[s] body parts” would not be considered defective 
because, objectively, such products “are designed to cause injuries and are 
thus not unfit for their intended purpose.”87 However, as Kysar observes, 
unlike experts, lay people “care a great deal about the manner in which a 
death occurs, particularly when it is accompanied by pain and suffering, 
terror, or some other dread-inducing characteristic.”88 Such subjective 
expectations should be taken seriously and not “dismissed as 
irrationalities . . . [to] be ignored in favor of more narrow instrumentalist 
balancing.”89  
If products liability law is to do its job, product safety/defect analysis 
should be upgraded to take consumer expectations regarding (un)acceptable 
levels of dangerosity into account. No doubt, this would lead to finding 
more products—e.g., slavery chocolate or blood diamonds or fast fashion 
apparel—defective, which will generate pushback from manufacturers. 
However, the output of such a regulatory upgrade would be additional 
disclosure of dangerosity information (e.g., through labeling or on company 
websites) and litigation only if the disclosures are inadequate or false, not 
prohibition from selling dangerous-in-fact items. Otherwise stated, 
upgraded products liability law would not proscribe abusive practices by 
companies; instead, it would expand the range of products considered to be 
unsafe and require that dangerosity be disclosed. Social-environmental 
dangerosity disclosures would make it easier for consumers to avoid 
purchases that pit them against their values and enhance their autonomy to 
make values-aligned choices. 
Requiring additional disclosure, whether via direct regulation or 
litigation, is a complicated and costly proposition.90 To assuage concerns 
about workability, Part IV offers some limiting principles for social-
environmental dangerosity disclosure. For now, note that if companies 
actually improve their sustainability performance and their reporting 
practices, as they are instructed to do under international (voluntary) norms, 
                                                 
87. Id. at 1767 (quoting Leslie v. United States, 986 F. Supp. 900, 902, 909 (D.N.J. 1997)). 
88. Id. (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Deaths, 14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 259, 268 (1997)). 
89. Id.  
90. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 
U. PA. L. REV. 647, 651 (2011); Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and 
Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565, 566, 578, 614 (2006) (offering a 
persuasive account of the complexities of information regulation and explaining that decisions about 
what and how to disclose “require balancing the costs and benefits of each incremental disclosure,” 
including “the physical cost of printing extra words on the product’s label, but also the potentially more 














then disclosure costs should diminish over time.91 Additionally, companies 
that offer safe-in-fact products “would have little to fear” and may even 
“flourish” if they come to face less competition from companies whose 
operations involve dangerous-in-fact processes and practices.92 A last point 
about upgrading products liability law to include psychic safety is that 
dangerosity disclosures would help to mitigate consumer confusion 
generated by sustainability noise. As discussed below, consumers are 
overloaded with information about companies “doing good in the world.” 
Having access to more and better dangerosity information would help 
consumers to home in on the true frequency of corporate do-goodery.  
C. Identity Harm as Modern Day Defamation 
To further flesh out the concept of psychic safety defect, this Section 
proposes that, alongside products liability, a good tort-fit for identity harm 
is defamation. Over the course of the twentieth century, Robert Rabin 
explains, “A more textured view of protecting individual autonomy came to 
be recognized, reflecting not only a higher regard for hurt feelings . . . but 
also a recognition that shock, fright, and other severe distress, even if caused 
by accidental misconduct . . . deserved qualified legal protection.”93 A 
renewed exploration of the terrain of autonomy-infringing harms would find 
identity harm comfortably nestled among already-recognized torts, such as 
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, assault, and 
defamation.94 Of these, identity harm bears the strongest resemblance to 
                                                 
91. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES 15–16 (2008), https://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/1922428.pdf [https://perma.cc/EW9 
J-43SH]; U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2011). 
92. Warren, supra note 75 (making the same point about providers of “good” consumer financial 
products). 
93. Rabin, supra note 50, at 16. 
94. For example, intentional infliction of emotional distress (extreme and outrageous conduct 
that intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another), RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); negligent infliction of emotional distress (conduct that places 
another in “zone of danger” or fear of physical injury is subject to liability, though fear of future harm 
is generally not covered; eyewitness NIED cases involve recovery for distress resulting from directly 
observing the injury or fatality of a close relative, while in zone of danger), Rabin, supra note 50, at 15–
16; battery (“harmful or offensive contact with the person” without actual or apparent consent), 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13, cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1965); assault (actor is subject to 
liability if acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other, or an 
imminent apprehension of such a contact and the other is put in such imminent apprehension), 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); and pain and suffering (actor causing 
pain and suffering attached to physical injury is liable for such pain and suffering since the latter is “part 
and parcel of the actual injury”; though “the footing for a precise and accurate estimate of damages may 
not be quite as sure and fixed . . . the actual damage is no less substantial and real), Rabin, supra note 
50, at 3 (quoting Morse v. Auburn & Syracuse R.R. Co., 10 Barb. 621, 623 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1851)).  
 











defamation, which involves injury to reputation via a false statement of 
fact.95  
Defamation is a “dignitary tort” that injures a plaintiff’s reputation or 
honor, rather than her property or body.96 The notion that an assault on 
dignity can cause cognizable harm helps firm our legal grasp on identity 
harm. Defamatory statements have classically been defined as those that 
expose a plaintiff to “hatred, contempt, or ridicule”; a more modern take is 
that they so harm the defamed individual’s reputation “as to lower him in 
the estimation of the community.”97 Defamation claims can also allege 
“mental anguish” or injury flowing from the “anger, hurt, or outrage that the 
victim feels” because of the defamatory statement.98 These concepts can 
easily be translated to describe the injury experienced by an identity-harmed 
consumer whose self-perception is undermined by a false virtuous promise. 
For example, although a Dieselgate victim is unlikely to be ridiculed or 
treated contemptuously by others, or to be lowered in public esteem, she 
may experience those sentiments privately, in regard to herself.  
Common law slander (oral) and libel (written), the torts from which 
defamation stems, rest on the view that there is a societal interest in 
preventing and redressing attacks on reputation.99 The importance that 
society has historically accorded to reputation can be traced in literature, 
including the work of Shakespeare who described a person’s “good name” 
as the “immediate jewel of [the] soul[].”100 In somewhat less artful 
language, the importance of reputation has also been articulated in legal 
opinions: “The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from 
                                                 
95. David A. Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 747, 
748 (1984) (discussing the presumption of harm in defamation cases and why it is hard to prove harm). 
96. David A. Anderson, Rethinking Defamation, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1047, 1047–48 (2006) 
(discussing possible changes to defamation law and questioning the need for a defamation restatement).  
97. Id. (quoting Parmiter v. Coupland (1840) 151 Eng. Rep. 340, 342 (Exch.) and RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 559).  
98. Anderson, supra at note 95, at 771–72 (explaining that plaintiffs can prove mental anguish 
by testifying about their physical reactions to the occurrence, like sleepiness, nervousness, and 
depression). 
99. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 
74 CALIF. L. REV. 691, 693 (1986) (discussing three concepts of reputation that defamation has been 
used to protect including reputation as honor, reputation as property, and reputation as dignity).  
100. Id. at 692 (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, act III, sc. iii, ll. 155–61: 
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord, 
Is the immediate jewel of their souls: 
Who steals my purse steals trash; ‘tis something, nothing, 
‘Twas mine ‘tis his, and has been slave to thousands;  
But he that filches from me my good name  
Robs me of that which not enriches him, 














unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic 
concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being—a concept 
at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.”101 The intrinsic value 
of reputation justifies presuming the injury caused by defamation:102  
[T]he plaintiff is relieved from the necessity of producing any proof 
whatsoever that he has been injured. . . . [D]amage to the plaintiff is 
said to be “presumed,” and the jury, without any further data, is at 
liberty to assess substantial damages, upon the assumption that the 
plaintiff’s reputation has been injured and his feelings wounded.103  
Just as courts protect the right to be free from “unjustified invasion” of 
reputation and preserve our autonomy to shape our “public selves,” so too 
should they protect the right to be free from the distortive effects of virtuous 
duperies and preserve our ever-more precious autonomy to shape our 
“market selves.” Particularly today, when citizenship and consumption are 
so deeply intertwined, being protected from identity harm is as important as 
being protected from reputational harm. This is why I propose treating 
identity harm as a modern day incarnation of defamation.  
In both the U.S. and the United Kingdom, defamation appears to have 
fallen by the wayside as a cause of action.104 This can perhaps be explained 
by societal changes toward the sanctity of public reputation; indeed, ours is 
a time when, as reflected in the rise of social media, so little is not public. 
But even if reputation is less sacred than it once was, dignity and integrity 
remain important.105 And one realm where dignity is currently under attack 
                                                 
101. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).  
102. Anderson, supra note 95, at 748 (justifying the presumption of harm and explaining how it 
differentiates defamation from other torts).   
103. Charles T. McCormick, The Measure of Damages for Defamation, 12 N.C. L. REV. 120, 127 
(1934). Until the 1960s, liability for false statements of fact about public officials that were harmful to 
reputation was strict, with no need to allege or prove negligence; the best recourse for defendants was 
to prove the statement’s truth, or “establish one of a variety of common law privileges” (e.g., common 
interest and fair comment). Rabin, supra note 50, at 17 n.64.  
104.  See Roy Greenslade, Privacy Claims Reach Record Level As Defamation Cases Fall Away, 
THE GUARDIAN (June 13, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2016/jun/13/privacy-
claims-reach-record-level-as-defamation-cases-fall-away (discussing the increase in privacy actions as 
an alternative to defamation claims); Daniel J. Solove, The Slow Demise of Defamation and the Privacy 
Torts, HUFFPOST (Oct. 11, 2010), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-j-solove/the-slow-demise-of-
defama_b_758570.html (attributing the decline in defamation lawsuits against the media in part to high 
litigation costs and increased information distribution via social media where originators lack deep 
pockets).  
105. Rabin, supra note 50, at 19 (“[T]he dignitary interest seems the dominant theme in American 
defamation law—an intangible harm theme.”). 
 











is consumer transactions.106  As discussed in Part I, consumer choices carry 
a great deal of personal, social, and political meaning; thus, the stakes 
involved in defining our market selves are high, especially today. Just as our 
public selves were once understood to be intimately bound up with our 
private selves, today the same can be said about our market selves—the 
distinction between our market selves and our private selves is becoming 
blurrier, in other words. Against this backdrop, it becomes possible to 
describe identity harm as a type of modern day defamation that is 
constituted by an attack on consumers’ autonomy to shape their market 
selves as they see fit. Such attacks are particularly wounding when 
consumers become complicit in hurting others. Indeed, it is hard to imagine 
a deeper distortion of one’s notion of oneself in the world than being made 
an (unwitting) participant in harming other beings.  
To summarize, recognizing the psychic safety defect possessed by 
identity-harming products is crucial for mobilizing consumers as civil 
regulators. Psychic safety defects can harm consumers in ways that are at 
least comparable to the personal injuries brought about by traditional 
product defects. Likewise, the psychic wounds inflicted by attacks on 
consumers’ autonomy to craft a values-aligned market self are at least 
comparable to those resulting from defamation. The protective principles at 
work in tort law should be extended to afford stronger protections for 
consumers’ virtuous expectations, both to shield them from the painful 
effects of virtuous duperies and to empower them as civil regulators.  
III. VIRTUOUS PROMISES AS CONTRACTUAL PROMISES 
Contract law is often described as the law of broken promises.107 This 
Part suggests some avenues for adapting contract law to serve as the law of 
broken virtuous promises, in order to better address identity harm. As 
explained, identity harm arises when a virtuous promise is broken and is 
perhaps most acute when the underlying promise is other-regarding since 
this implicates the consumer in hurting others. The previous Part discussed 
possibilities for addressing identity harm as a products liability or a 
dignitary tort. Here, we review possibilities for addressing identity harm as 
a contract law violation. One way to “contractualize” identity harm is to 
make it a promises problem. This begs the questions, What virtuous 
promises give rise to identity harm? And how far should the virtuous 
                                                 
106. For a persuasive account of how consumer autonomy is being undermined through  
contemporary contracting practices, see Margaret Jane Radin, BOILERPLATE (2014); particularly 
relevant is her discussion of “varieties of nonconsent” where she explains how duress, fraud, but also 
“sheer ignorance” and “uninformed consent” can eviscerate voluntariness and, by extension, the 
freedom to (and not to) contract. Id., at 19–29. 













promises net be cast? In addressing these questions, this Part explains the 
problem of sustainability noise as a generator of—largely non-actionable—
virtuous promises; it argues for the promises net to be cast more widely in 
order to capture more virtuous promises and hold accountable those firms 
that are not as “good” as they claim to be. The discussion highlights key 
challenges involved with using contract law to tackle identity harm and 
carries over into the next Part, which explores the potential and challenges 
of relying on state consumer law to address identity harm grievances.  
A. Sustainability Noise 
An important measure of the rise of conscious consumerism and the 
market for virtue is the proliferation of certifications. Indeed, certifications 
appear on an expanding array of products—for example, clothing, food, 
cleaning products, and home appliances.108 Certifications contain 
sustainability-related virtuous promises that speak directly to consumers’ 
desire to be good (or simply better) global citizens. They communicate to 
consumers that item X meets certain sustainability standards that pertain to 
its production or use. Process-related standards and certifications tell a story 
about how a product (e.g., coffee, a cell phone, and apparel) was made, how 
workers and their communities were treated, and the environmental impacts 
of production. Use-related standards and certifications tell a story about the 
environmental impact of using the product (e.g., a washing machine or 
detergent).  
Fairtrade International is perhaps the best known among the process-
related certifications. It promises that certified products give farmers a 
better deal, affording them “the opportunity to improve their lives and plan 
for their future.”109 To see the other-regarding dimension of the fair-trade 
promise, consider that it is “based on a partnership between producers and 
consumers” that “offers consumers a powerful way to reduce poverty 
                                                 
108. Margaret Chon, Slow Logo: Brand Citizenship in Global Value Networks, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 935, 958 (2014) (quoting Doug Miller & Peter Williams, What Price a Living Wage? 
Implementation Issues in the Quest for Decent Wages in the Global Apparel Sector, 9 GLOBAL SOC. 
POL’Y 99, 438 (2009))(“[L]abor standards certification programs are attempting to be more ‘regulatory’ 
than some other labeling efforts, although they clearly mix regulatory strategies with marketing ones.”); 
Johnston, supra note 36, at 229 (noting that Whole Foods uses certifications to appeal to environmentally 
conscious consumers by combining consumerism with collective social responsibility); Peter Leigh 
Taylor, In the Market but Not of It: Fair Trade Coffee and Forest Stewardship Council Certification as 
Market-Based Social Change, 33 WORLD DEV. 129 (2005) (“Certification and labeling initiatives world-
wide gain growing attention as promising market-based instruments which harness globalization’s own 
mechanisms to address the very social injustice and environmental degradation globalization fosters.”). 
109. What Is Fairtrade?, FAIRTRADE INT’L, https://www.fairtrade.net/about-fairtrade/what-is-fair  
trade.html [https://perma.cc/Q73Z-RWNY].  
 











through their every day shopping.”110 Fair-trade certifications (there are 
several aside from Fairtrade International) aim to strengthen the social 
bonds between consumers and producers, and succeed (or fail) depending 
on how effectively they nurture what Kevin Kolben refers to as the 
“consumer imaginary.”111 Josée Johnston explains that the fair-trade 
movement has stimulated conscious consumption for many types of goods 
(especially food) by drawing attention to the reality that “many of the worst 
abuses in the global system are associated with foods that are integrated into 
our everyday life through transnational commodity chains—sugar, bananas, 
coffee, chocolate—magnifying consumers’ complicity in social abuses 
associated with their production.”112  
Certification and standards-based schemes are supposed to help 
consumers differentiate between products on the basis of their sustainability 
features and between products that truly are sustainable from those that 
merely claim to be—a practice referred to as “greenwashing”113 for 
environmental claims, and sometimes as “redwashing” or “bluewashing” 
for social claims.114 However, there are so many certifications and certifiers 
that even the most rigorously conscious consumers can quickly become 
overwhelmed and confused by the amount of information permeating the 
market for virtue.115 Aggravating this problem, many sustainability-related 
virtuous promises are not made via logo-based certifications on product 
packaging, but rather through general marketing, including on company 
websites116 and in company codes of conduct, annual CSR reports, and 
                                                 
110. Id. 
111. See Kolben, supra note 40. 
112. See Johnston, supra note 36, at 239 (emphasis added). 
113. Greenwashing happens when a company seeks to boost sales by overstating its environmental 
achievements. For a detailed explanation and solutions, see Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, 
Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate Social Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 
85 TUL. L. REV. 983, 999–1009, 1025–38 (2011). 
114. Wayne Visser, Exposing the CSR Pretenders, WAYNE VISSER BLOG BRIEFING (Oct. 27, 
2011), http://www.waynevisser.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/blog_csr_pretenders_wvisser.pdf [htt 
ps://perma.cc/C647-HTSC] (explaining that “bluewashing” refers to businesses that use their association 
with the United Nations, which has a blue logo, to appear more responsible than they really are).  
115. Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate Governance Beyond the 
Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 61 (2010) (noting the absence of legally mandated 
environmental, social, and governance disclosures); Roger D. Wynne, The Emperor’s New Eco-Logos?: 
A Critical Review of the Scientific Certification Systems Environmental Report Card and the Green Seal 
Certification Mark Programs, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 54 (1994) (noting that vague and unverifiable 
sustainability claims that offer half-truths or no tangible environmental benefits overwhelm consumers’ 
ability to “discern truly green products from those merely labeled as such”). 
116. For example, Everlane, the online clothing retailer, expresses its commitment to “Radical 
Transparency” and invites customers to “#KnowYourFactories” adding, “We spend months finding the 
best factories around the world . . . . Each factory is given a compliance audit to evaluate factors like fair 
wages, reasonable hours, and environment. Our goal? A score of 90 or above for every factory.” About 














supplier agreements.117 Virtuous promises can also be generated when a 
company joins a sustainability-focused industry association, such as the 
International Cocoa Initiative, which is dedicated to promoting child safety 
in the cocoa sector,118 or the Responsible Business Alliance (RBA), whose 
members comprise leading electronics companies committed to being “held 
accountable to a common Code of Conduct . . . to support continuous 
improvement in the social, environmental and ethical responsibility of their 
supply chains”;119 or by affiliation with international sustainability 
programs, such as the United Nations Global Compact,120 or a multi-
stakeholder initiative, such as the Sustainable Apparel Coalition.121  
The multiplicity of sustainability-related virtuous promises creates a 
great deal of sustainability noise. Companies surround-sound themselves in 
this noise to attract consumers, but also to lull consumers into a false sense 
of comfort that the global supply chains they buy from are more socially 
and environmentally sound than they actually are. Another reason why 
sustainability noise is nefarious is that it often shields companies from 
liability when the truth about their unsustainability is revealed. Indeed, 
virtuous promises that are diffused by way of sustainability noise tend to be 
                                                 
117. For example, the mega-company, H&M, makes commitments in its 2016 Sustainability 
Report to collect 25,000 tonnes of garments per year by 2020, to use 100% sustainable cotton by 2020, 
to use 100% sustainably sourced or recycled materials by 2030, to achieve fair jobs for all and to serve 
as stewards for diversity and inclusivity. H&M, THE H&M GROUP SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 10–13 
(2016), https://sustainability.hm.com/content/dam/hm/about/documents/en/CSR/2016%20Sustainabilit  
y%20report/HM_group_SustainabilityReport_2016_FullReport_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/KLW3-32W 
2]. 
118. About Us, INT’L COCOA INITIATIVE, http://www.cocoainitiative.org/about-ici/about-us/ [http 
s://perma.cc/3EXJ-YM9T] (stating that ICI promotes “child protection in cocoa-growing communities” 
and “unites the forces of the cocoa and chocolate industry, civil society, farming communities and 
national governments in cocoa-producing countries to ensure a better future for children and to advance 
the elimination of child labour”). 
119. About the RBA, RESPONSIBLE BUS. ALL., http://www.responsiblebusiness.org/about [https:// 
perma.cc/3H22-REUJ] (“[C]ommitted to supporting the rights and wellbeing of workers and 
communities worldwide affected by the global [electronics] supply chain.”). 
120. The U.N. Global Compact is a voluntary initiative that issues “[a] call to companies to align 
strategies and operations with universal principles on human rights, labour, environment and anti-
corruption, and take actions that advance societal goals.” What is the UN Global Compact, U.N. GLOBAL 
COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc [https://perma.cc/7YM2-XKCZ]. 
121. The Sustainable Apparel Coalition is a multi-stakeholder initiative that brings together 
“[c]ompanies from every segment of fashion, manufacturing and retailing from all over the globe,” as 
well as “academic research groups, NGOs dedicated to labor, trade and environmental issues, affiliated 
trade organizations and sustainability service providers.” Members, SUSTAINABLE APPAREL COAL., 
http://apparelcoalition.org/members/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2017). Stakeholders share visions “of an 
apparel, footwear and home textiles industry that produces no unnecessary environmental harm and has 
a positive impact on the people and communities associated with its activities.” Our Vision, 
SUSTAINABLE APPAREL COAL., https://apparelcoalition.org/our-vision/ [https://perma.cc/FU22-EAW 
8]. 
 











viewed by courts only as “aspirational” or non-actionable 
(mis)representations.122 Such loose treatment of virtuous promises is highly 
problematic as it perpetuates the occurrence of identity harm and breeds 
distrust in the marketplace. A key challenge is therefore to find ways to 
make sustainability-related virtuous promises, whether direct or indirect, 
actionable. The following Section highlights the magnitude of this 
challenge, and suggests some openings for further exploration.123 
B. The Challenge of Enforcing Virtuous Promises 
The law of warranties helps identify what promises are included in 
contracts for the sale of goods. Understanding how warranties law applies 
to the virtuous promises made by corporations highlights some of the 
challenges involved with enforcing these promises, whether as a breach of 
warranty or a contractual misrepresentation.124 Where a misrepresentation 
is fraudulent, as it was with Dieselgate, it is usually much easier to succeed 
on a breach of contract claim. However, before a court can even reach the 
question of whether a representation or assertion was fraudulent, it must 
establish that a representation or assertion was actually made. And that is 
where identity-harmed consumers seeking to use contract law to hold 
promise breaking corporations accountable run into difficulty. This Section 
shows how hard it is to include virtuous promises, particularly those 
contained in side communications such as CSR reports and company codes 
of conduct, within the realm of actionable promises.  
Warranties come in two main varieties, express and implied. For 
purposes of making sustainability-related virtuous promises actionable, 
express warranties are the most relevant—although implied warranties also 
hold some promise, as I intend to explore in future writings.125 Express 
                                                 
 122. Hoffman, infra note 128, at 1403 (explaining that many statements are lumped into the 
puffery or aspirational category because “neither courts nor regulators consider empirical evidence about 
which claims imply facts” and which don’t; otherwise put, courts know too little about how consumers 
actually process marketing information to carry out puffery analysis in a coherent fashion).  
123. Craswell, supra note 90, at 606 (explaining that contract law is lacking “when it comes to 
determining what any given representation actually asserts”). 
124. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 159 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) defines 
misrepresentation as “an assertion that is not in accord with the facts” and § 161 distinguishes between 
misrepresentations made via direct assertions and those made via non-disclosure, while §162 
distinguishes between fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations based on whether “the maker intends 
his assertion to induce a party to manifest his assent . . . .” (emphasis added).  
125. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (express warranty is 
“[a]ny affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and 
becomes part of the basis of the bargain”); U.C.C. § 2-714 (if an express warranty is established and the 
goods are found to be non-conforming, the buyer can obtain remedies including the difference in price 














warranties are statements of fact about a product, made orally (e.g., in a 
television or radio advertisement or by a salesperson on a used car lot)126 or 
in writing (e.g., on a label, in a print advertisement, a brochure or catalog, 
or on a website).127 The more specific and verifiable the statement, the more 
likely it is to be treated as an express warranty.128 Assertions such as “car X 
produces less emissions than car Y” or “this wireless mouse has a 300 hour 
battery life” would likely qualify as express warranties, while statements of 
opinion or puffery, such as “you’ll love the smell” or “this is the best pizza, 
ever,” likely would not.129 For identity harm purposes, the question is 
whether virtuous promises, particularly those made in side communications 
(e.g., CSR reports, codes of conduct, and supplier agreements), rather than 
directly on product packaging, could be treated as express warranties. For 
example, would H&M’s commitment in its CSR report to “source 100% 
sustainable cotton by 2020” be viewed as an express warranty? What about 
RBA’s website statement that members commit to being “held accountable 
to a common Code of Conduct” that supports the rights and well-being of 
workers and communities affected by the global electronics supply chain? 
Or the assertion by online clothing retailer Everlane that its staff members 
                                                 
126. See U.C.C. 2-313(1)(a); Marketing and Advertising: Express Warranty or Puffing?, PARKER 
POE (Apr. 30, 2008), http://www.parkerpoe.com/newsevents/2008/04/marketing-and-advertising-expre 
ss-warranty-or-puffing [https://perma.cc/FU22-EAW8] (explaining that photographs and statements on 
a company’s website may qualify as express warranties). 
127. See, e.g., Cover v. Windsor Surry Co., No. 14-cv-05262-WHO, 2016 WL 3421361, at *6–7 
(N.D. Cal. June 22, 2016); In re Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc. All Nat. Litig., No. 12-MD-2413, 2013 WL 
4647512, at *26–27 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2013) (“all natural” label is express warranty); Podobedov v. 
Living Essentials, L.L.C., No. CV 11-6408, 2012 WL 2513458, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2012) 
(advertisements regarding active ingredients in energy drink create express warranties); Forcellati v. 
Hyland’s, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1162–63 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (statements on packaging create 
warranty); Stewart v. Smart Balance, Inc., No. 11-6174, 2012 WL 4168584, at *13 (D.N.J. June 26, 
2012) (“fat free” label is express warranty); Snyder v. Farnam Cos., 792 F. Supp. 2d 712, 722 (D.N.J. 
2011) (refusing to dismiss express warranty claim based on statements made on manufacturer’s 
website); Hobbs v. Gen. Motors Corp., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1281 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (statements in 
owner’s manual could create warranties); Carrau v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 869, 
874 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (assertion in advertisement, if read and relied on by buyer, may act as 
warranty); Mennonite Deaconess Home & Hosp., Inc. v. Gates Eng’g Co., 363 N.W.2d 155, 161–62 
(Neb. 1985) (holding that representations made in brochures can create express warranties where the 
seller asserts a fact of which the buyer is ignorant or on which the seller expects the buyer to rely in 
making the purchase). 
128. David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395, 1397–98 (2006) 
(recalling that “[p]uffery is a ‘vague statement’ boosting the appeal of a service or product that, because 
of its vagueness and unreliability, is immunized from regulation” and explaining why this too-simple 
definition “leads authorities to overprotect commercial speech from liability”). Hoffman clarifies that, 
“[l]egally, the most significant characteristic of ‘puffery’ is that it is a defense to a charge of misleading 
purchasers . . . or to a charge that a promisor has made a legally cognizable promise.” Id. at 1400. 
129. Marketing and Advertising: Express Warranty or Puffing?, supra note 126 (“A salesperson’s 
statement of her opinion of the product’s value is known as ‘puffing.’”).  
 











“spend months finding the best factories around the world” and that “[e]ach 
factory is given a compliance audit to evaluate factors like fair wages, 
reasonable hours, and environment”?130 Would these virtuous promises be 
treated as actionable or merely as aspirational puffery?131  
Though limited, the case law indicates that most sustainability-related 
promises would count only as aspirational statements, meaning that virtuous 
statements in side communications are likely to be non-actionable. For 
example, in Bondali v. Yum! Brands, Inc., the company was sued for its 
failure to adhere to statements about its food safety standards contained in 
its code of conduct.132 The court held that a company’s “code of conduct is 
not a guarantee that a corporation will adhere to everything set forth” 
therein.133 Rather, it contains only “a declaration of corporate 
aspirations.”134  
A somewhat more promising case is Ruiz v. Darigold, Inc., where 
plaintiffs alleged that Darigold and the Northwest Dairy Association (NDA) 
used their CSR report to mislead consumers into thinking “‘that the 
company’s member dairies treated their workers and cows well’ and/or that 
Darigold ‘treat[ed] its workers and cows with respect and in compliance 
with the law.’”135 The court found that “[e]ven if the Court considers the ten 
sentences or phrases on which plaintiff’s claims of misrepresentation and 
omission rely, when read in context they reflect a nuanced assessment of 
the current situation, are aspirational statements, or have not been shown to 
be false in any material respect.”136 However, the court also suggested that 
the language regarding the NDA producers’ adoption of “world-class 
husbandry” techniques was potentially actionable: if “a term like ‘world-
class’ is capable of being proven or disproven,” and if plaintiffs had alleged 
“any facts suggesting that Darigold’s farmers fall below that standard or 
                                                 
130. Supra notes 116–119. 
131. Hoffman, supra note 128, at 1396 (“We are constantly exposed to speech . . . encouraging us 
to buy goods, invest in stocks, and transact for services. This speech is often intentionally misleading, is 
usually vivid and memorable, and induces many of us to rely on it. But the law, which normally punishes 
lies for profit, encourages this speech by immunizing it as ‘mere puffery.’”). Hoffman highlights the 
major problem that puffery “is assumed not to work” by regulators and courts, even though extensive 
empirical research shows that puffery does work; it convinces buyers to buy, because, ultimately, 
“positive emotional effect, and not rational choice, drives purchasing decisions.” Id. at 1441–42. As a 
result, under the current doctrine, clever marketers are “able to have their cake (immunity) and eat it too 
(exploitation of a small class of consumers).” Id. at 1441. 
132. Bondali v. Yum! Brands, Inc., 620 F. App’x 483, 487 (6th Cir. 2015). This is a securities 
class action but the court’s treatment of CSR-related statements is nevertheless valuable.  
133. Id. at 490. 
134. Id. (“To treat a corporate code of conduct as a statement of what a corporation will do, rather 
than what a corporation aspires to do, would turn the purpose of a code of conduct on its head.”).  
135. Ruiz v. Darigold, Inc., No. 14-cv-1283, 2014 WL 5599989, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 3, 2014). 














have otherwise been deficient in animal husbandry,” then their 
misrepresentation claims would have stood a better chance.137 The 
implication is that company statements that make reference to industry 
standards and that describe company performance in relation to those 
standards could be treated as actionable promises, even when contained in 
a side communication. Since many corporations sign onto and advertise 
their membership in standards-based initiatives (e.g., the RBA, fair-trade 
certifications), Ruiz points to an important, albeit small, opening for some 
sustainability-related virtuous promises to become actionable.  
Not long after Ruiz, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia issued 
an even more promising decision involving CSR statements published on 
company websites. In National Consumers League v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
J.C. Penney Corporation, and The Children’s Place, Inc., (NCL), the court 
denied in part and granted in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss where 
the League alleged that defendants had violated the D.C. Consumer 
Protection Procedures Act by not enforcing “their own Corporate 
Statements in dealing with suppliers, thereby violating their promises to the 
general public.”138 Each company had made statements expressing an 
expectation that (1) its suppliers comply with applicable laws and 
regulations; (2) its suppliers provide a safe and healthy working 
environment, free of child labor; and a commitment to (3) audit supplier 
compliance with its (buyer-company) standards.139 The court granted 
defendant’s motion for statements falling under (1) and (2) because they 
“are generally aspirational in nature” and, as such, cannot be “recast … into 
promises.”140 However, with respect to statements under (3), the court 
denied defendants’ motion saying that those statements are “more specific 
and contain verifiable facts that may be material to a consumer’s purchasing 
decisions.”141 In other words, because the auditing statements were specific 
and verifiable, they were sufficient for purposes of stating an actionable 
claim under D.C. consumer law. The court did not reach the merits of the 
allegations and the case eventually settled, but the recognition that CSR 
commitments can sometimes be actionable is a big precedential step in the 
right direction for identity-harmed claimants. 
                                                 
137. Id. at 6–7 (emphases added).  
138. Nat’l Consumers League v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., J.C. Penney Corp., and The Children’s 
Place, Inc., No. 2015- CA-007731, 2016 WL 4080541, at *1 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 22, 2016) (defendants 
had sourced supplies from Rana Plaza, a factory in Bangladesh that collapsed in 2013 killing over 1000 
workers, including children; the League relied on the collapse to support the inference that defendants 
had failed to honor their CSR promises). 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. at *7. 











This brief attempt to employ contract law to address identity harm 
quickly reveals how easy it is for virtuous promises to slip through the 
enforceable promises net. Most virtuous promises will be treated as 
aspirational only. And while Ruiz and NCL open some doors for aggrieved 
consumers, those doors have yet to be successfully walked through. 
Moreover, both cases were decided under state consumer statutes, which, as 
discussed in Part IV, is more flexible about qualifying statements as 
misleading as compared with common contract law. Overall, claimants 
wanting to employ warranties or contractual misrepresentation to hold 
promise-breaking companies accountable will not have an easy go of it. 
Actionability challenges are even more acute under the tort of common law 
fraud since the latter requires a “blameworthy state of mind” and “deliberate 
deception that induces reliance.”142 In light of the continuing proliferation 
of noisy sustainability promises that not only shape consumers’ virtuous 
expectations but also increase the likelihood that those expectations will be 
exploited, the current state of legal affairs is highly problematic. The 
challenge is to push on the law of broken promises to cast a wider net over 
virtuous promises so that more sustainability-related claims, including those 
made in side communications, can be treated as actionable.  
IV. OPERATIONALIZING IDENTITY HARM IN STATE CONSUMER LAW 
Consumer law provides a good legal home for identity-harmed 
consumers since it deals specifically with grievances ensuing from 
consumer transactions and, more particularly, with grievances attached to 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices (UDAP).143 Importantly, consumer law 
adopts a relatively generous approach to determining what types of acts and 
practices qualify as deceptive. At the federal level, a deceptive act or 
practice refers to a “representation, omission, or practice that is likely to 
mislead the consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances as to a 
material fact.”144 This definition has been adopted at the state level by way 
of “little FTC Acts” or state UDAP statutes; for example, California’s 
Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), Unfair Competition Law (UCL), 
and False Advertising Law (FAL) comprise that state’s UDAP statutes and 
                                                 
142. Davis, supra note 107, at 535–36.  
143. CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE 
STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES 18–21 
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“prohibit promotional materials that misrepresent or omit facts in a way that 
is likely to mislead or deceive a reasonable consumer.”145  
The “likely to mislead” standard makes it easier for aggrieved consumers 
to bring claims under statutory consumer law than common law fraud, 
which requires showing intent to deceive. Additionally, consumer law has 
a more supple approach for establishing injury than tort or contract. To have 
standing to sue, plaintiffs in most states need only allege that they have 
suffered an “ascertainable loss,”146 which does not necessarily require 
showing out-of-pocket loss (e.g., a drop in market value or lower resale 
price) and can include less tangible injuries, such as diminished subjective 
value.147 Indeed, none of the identity harm cases discussed below failed for 
lack of standing. In each case, the drop in the product’s subjective value 
following the revelation of its sustainability truth was sufficient. However, 
as discussed below, consumer law still demands too much of identity-
harmed consumers, especially where claims are based on omission rather 
than affirmative misrepresentation.  
This Part recommends avenues for strengthening the protective capacity 
of consumer law, with a primary focus on California’s UDAP statutes. 
There are three reasons to choose California as the identity harm “laboratory 
state.” First, most identity harm cases have emerged from California, 
including Nike v. Kasky;148 the Chocolate Cases; Wirth v. Mars,149 Barber 
v. Nestlé,150 and Sud v. Costco (together, the Seafood Cases); and the 
Dieselgate multidistrict litigation, making California ideal for studying the 
legal treatment of identity harm. Second, although state UDAP statutes do 
differ, they also have much in common as they are modelled on the FTC 
Act. Analyzing the workings of California’s UDAP statutes should 
therefore provide insights into the workings of state UDAP statutes, 
generally—or at least help identify relevant disparities. Third, California is 
                                                 
145. Ruiz, 2014 WL 5599989, at *3. 
146. DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW § 5:9 
(2018–2019). 
147. Id. § 5:10. 
148. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 243–248 (Cal. 2002) (Marc Kasky sued Nike on behalf of 
California citizens for misrepresenting its labor practices—saying they were good, when in fact factories 
were plagued with human and labor rights violations—and making misleading statements to this effect 
in documents including press releases and letters to newspapers, university presidents, and athletic 
directors.). 
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2016). (Plaintiffs alleged violations of California UDAP statutes because Mars did not disclose that its 
pet food could contain seafood fished by slave labor in Thailand.).  
150. Barber v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 3d 954, 957 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (Plaintiffs’ UDAP 
claims alleged that Nestlé had duty to disclose the use of forced labor in its Fancy Feast cat food supply 
chain.). 
 











the only state to have adopted hard law on global supply chain governance: 
the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010 (CSCA).151 
The CSCA requires large companies doing business in California to 
disclose information about their supply chains, such as whether they have a 
process in place for conducting human rights due diligence.152 It does not 
require companies to make any adjustments to their due diligence process, 
or to meet minimum human rights standards, or even to disclose abuses 
within their supply chains.153 The CSCA could help validate identity harm 
claims since it recognizes that consumers want more information about the 
social soundness of the companies they patronize; indeed, the purpose of 
the CSCA is to give consumers access to “basic” information to “aid their 
purchasing decisions.”154 Whether the CSCA is succeeding is highly 
questionable, but its very existence signals that the California legislature 
views at least some types of sustainability-related information as 
material.155 On the flip side, the CSCA may actually be hurting California 
consumers. Recent identity harm cases have faced serious challenges 
because defendant companies argued that their duty to disclose is limited to 
the “basic” requirements of the CSCA and that the safe harbor doctrine 
shields them from any additional disclosure requirements coming from a 
“novel application of California consumer protection law.”156 Identity-
harmed consumers will need to watch out for how the overlap-cum-conflict 
between the CSCA and California’s UDAP statutes is managed by the 
courts. It may be necessary to return to the California legislature for 
clarification of (or amendment to) the CSCA’s approach to the 
nondisclosure of supply chain abuses. 
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A. Dangerosity Omissions and Virtuous Misrepresentations  
One advantage of bringing identity harm claims under consumer law is 
that either representations or omissions can be used as the basis for UDAP 
violations. However, plaintiffs alleging violations via the omissions of 
dangerosity information must overcome serious hurdles. Specifically, there 
is no standalone duty to disclose (even material) information (e.g., the use 
of child labor in the cacao supply chain).157 Instead, the duty to disclose 
applies only when (1) the information presents a safety issue for consumers, 
or (2) disclosure is necessary to correct an affirmative misrepresentation, or 
(3) the defendant has exclusive control over the information that the plaintiff 
wants disclosed.158 This Section attempts to make identity harm fit into each 
of these exceptions, in turn.  
The Chocolate and Seafood Cases decisions refer to the rejection by 
California courts of “a broad obligation to disclose” in favor of a duty that 
is “limited to [defendant’s] warranty obligations absent either an affirmative 
misrepresentation or a safety issue.”159 The limited disclosure standard was 
used to justify the dismissal of the Chocolate and the Seafood Cases because 
the plaintiffs failed to show that the companies had a duty to disclose the 
use of slave labor in their products. Had the companies actively “lied to 
consumers—by proclaiming there was no possibility that forced labor 
existed in their supply chain, for instance—then Plaintiffs would have 
actionable claims based on these misrepresentations.”160 At the outset, then, 
cases alleging UDAP violations via omissions of dangerosity information 
are less likely to survive as compared with cases alleging affirmative 
misrepresentations. As such, omissions claims need more “help” from 
identity harm.  
Psychic safety disclosure: Perhaps the most direct way for identity harm 
to lend support to claimants in cases involving omissions would be to 
expand the notion of defect to include the psychic safety defect described in 
Part II. The Chocolate and Seafood Cases decisions found no duty to 
disclose the possible use of forced labor in the supply chain in part because 
none of the complaints alleged a safety or product defect issue. But what if 
the plaintiffs had tried to assert a psychic safety issue or defect? As 
discussed earlier, while products liability typically involves physical injury 
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to person or property, a colorable argument can be made that the psychic 
safety issues created by identity-harming products constitute a type of 
personal injury that warrants protection. Moreover, tort law recognizes 
intangible harms, including standalone emotional distress, assault, and 
defamation as personal injury. The protective principle making such 
recognition(s) possible should be imported into state UDAP statutes, as this 
would better effectuate their purpose of protecting today’s increasingly 
sustainability-conscious consumers.161  
Now, to persuade courts even to consider expanding the notion of defect, 
it will be necessary to assuage the concern that a broader duty to disclose 
would be unworkable for companies and for courts because too many 
people care about too many different things. To illustrate this concern, 
consider Hall v. Sea World Entertainment, Inc., where plaintiffs alleged that 
had they known the omitted information concerning the health and living 
conditions of whales at SeaWorld, they would not have purchased tickets to 
enter the park.162 Declining to find that SeaWorld had violated its duty to 
disclose, the court said that an alternative conclusion would “effectively 
require any company selling any product or service to affirmatively disclose 
every conceivable piece of information about that product or service (or 
even about the company generally) because inevitably some customer 
would find such information relevant to his or her purchase.”163 Adopting 
this view, the Wirth court declined to find that Mars had violated its duty to 
disclose when it did not include information pertaining to the use of slave 
labor in the cat food supply chain.164 However, the court added that it was 
“troubled by [p]laintiffs’ proposed interpretation of the duty to disclose 
under California law because [p]laintiffs offer no meaningful limiting 
principle.”165 This suggests that if the plaintiffs had provided a limiting 
principle, a different conclusion could have been reached.  
I propose that identity harm can offer such a limiting principle by 
narrowing disclosure requirements in three ways. First, identity harm would 
expand the duty to disclose, but only for dangerosity information that 
safeguards consumers’ autonomy to make values-aligned purchases and to 
steer clear of purchases that pit them against their values. Second, the  to-
be-disclosed dangerosity information should be other-regarding, meaning 
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that it carries  implications for the well-being (or ill-being) of others beyond 
the consumer—e.g., workers and the planet. Third, the information should 
pertain to the product (or service) at issue, not the company. Otherwise put, 
under an expanded duty to disclose, companies would not be required to 
reveal information about, for example, their contributions to political 
campaigns or charity or promotional and loyalty programs.166 Instead, the 
information would need to be tied to the product at issue in the case, to its 
social, ethical, and environmental (production and use) story. Applying this 
three-part limiting principle for disclosing dangerosity information, the Hall 
plaintiffs would have succeeded in requiring SeaWorld to disclose 
information about orca health because that information (a) would preserve 
consumer autonomy to make values-aligned choices, (b) is other-regarding 
(concerned with the well-being of whales), and (c) is specific to the 
SeaWorld product/service (the experience of being in the world of the sea).  
Disclosure to correct affirmative misrepresentation: Identity harm can 
also lend support in omissions cases by widening the warranties net to bring 
more virtuous promises under the actionability umbrella. California law 
limits the duty to disclose to a defendant’s “warranty obligations absent 
either an affirmative misrepresentation or a safety issue.”167 If, as 
recommended in Part III, express warranties were expanded to include the 
virtuous promises contained in direct (label packaging and advertisements) 
and side communications (CSR reports, codes of conduct, supplier 
contracts, etc.), then companies would be required to disclose any 
dangerosity information that qualifies or cuts into their virtuous warranties. 
Put another way, if it turns out that the product is non-conforming, then the 
relevant dangerosity information should be disclosed to ensure that 
consumers remain apprised of the (correct) terms of the transaction. This 
would ensure that information asymmetries are continually corrected and 
preserve consumers’ autonomy to make values-aligned purchases.  
As mentioned, cases where the issue is a false virtuous promise—i.e., 
where the identity harm is borne out of an affirmative lie—should be easier 
to litigate. However, it will still be necessary to establish that the virtuous 
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promise at issue is actionable. Part III explained that this can be challenging, 
particularly when the virtuous promises are contained in side 
communications. Indeed, the Barber court agreed with Nestlé that its 
Corporate Business Principles (adopting the U.N. Global Compact 
principles on human rights and labor), its Supplier Code of Conduct, and its 
Responsible Sourcing Guidelines contained only aspirational statements 
that do not qualify as affirmative misrepresentations.168 Focusing on 
Nestlé’s Supplier Code, the court found that the stipulated requirements 
“represent an ideal, and not necessarily a reality”; furthermore, “no 
reasonable consumer who reads the . . . documents . . . in context could 
conclude that Nestlé’s suppliers comply with Nestlé’s requirements in all 
circumstances.” 169 Thus, the court concluded, Nestlé “does not mislead 
[consumers] into thinking that its suppliers abide by those rules and meet 
those expectations in every instance.”170  
This Article recommends that judges adopt a more aggressive attitude 
toward aspirational statements that shape and target consumers’ other-
regarding expectations. Such statements shroud sellers in sustainability 
noise so loud that it is too easy for them to say, “But we didn’t actually 
promise anything.” While a clear distinction between statements of fact and 
puffery remains necessary in most sale of goods cases, that distinction 
should be drawn less sharply with respect to companies’ other-regarding 
virtuous promises because this is an area where information asymmetries 
are particularly problematic, morally. A more aggressive approach would 
mitigate the trust-costs of identity-harming incidents and allow consumers 
who participate in the market for virtue to do so more confidently, knowing 
that there will be consequences if their virtuous expectations are exploited.  
Disclosure due to seller’s exclusive control: Next we must question the 
theory that if consumers have access to dangerosity information, then that 
must mean that the seller does not have exclusive control over the truth 
about its operations. The Dana court said that even if a duty to disclose the 
use of forced child labor could be established, plaintiffs would still need to 
show that Hershey had “‘exclusive knowledge of material facts not known 
or reasonably accessible to’ its customers.”171 Because Hershey’s CSR 
report acknowledged the child-slavery problem, and it had been recognized 
by the industry in the Harkin-Engel Protocol back in 2001, and a report 
commissioned by the U.S. Department of Labor had documented the 
persistence of the problem over the years, it made no sense to describe the 
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child-slavery dangerosity information as being within Hershey’s exclusive 
control.172 In other words, the Chocolate Cases plaintiffs would have lost, 
even if they had established a duty to disclose. How can identity harm help? 
While it may be true that consumers can access dangerosity information 
by hunting for it, it is also true that (a) hunting is onerous (if not punishing) 
for consumers seeking to avoid purchases that support human and 
environmental abuse;173 (b) the volume of information and sustainability 
noise is such that it can be difficult to make values-aligned purchases with 
any real degree of confidence—unless one gives up making purchases 
altogether, which, while effective for avoiding identity harm, does not seem 
like a fair choice for consumers; and (c) the dangerosity information that is 
available can be inconsistent with the virtuous information that companies 
use to market themselves. For example, in 2012, Hershey issued a press 
release in which the company committed to sourcing “100 percent certified 
cocoa for its global chocolate product lines by 2020 and accelerat[ing] its 
programs to help eliminate child labor in the cocoa regions of West 
Africa.”174 How should consumers reconcile this with Hershey’s CSR 
Report, which states without qualification that “Hershey has zero tolerance 
for the worst forms of child labor in its supply chain”?175 And should 
consumers be expected to keep track of the fact that the 2012 press release 
once more extended the deadline for sourcing child-labor-free cocoa (a 
deadline originally set for 2005, then 2008, then 2010)?176 Upon what 
representations should consumers rely to inform their purchasing decisions? 
At a minimum, it seems fair to conclude that Hershey retained superior (if 
not exclusive) control over the truth about the use of child labor in its supply 
chain given that the information to which consumers do have access is 
confusing and inconsistent.  
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As it stands, courts adjudicating identity harm claims ask too much of 
consumers. Consumers must effectively take full responsibility for policing 
their own exposure to identity harm. In the Chocolate Cases example, 
consumers must not only pierce through loud sustainability noise to obtain 
accurate dangerosity information—searching far beyond the narrow CSCA 
disclosures—to ensure that they aren’t supporting child slavery, they must 
also keep track of companies’ shifting sustainability commitments. This is 
flatly under-protective. If followed, the recommendations in this Part would 
better protect consumers from identity harm and better protect the market 
for virtue from the credibility attacks leveled upon it by broken virtuous 
promises. This would empower consumers to be more effective civil 
regulators of corporate (mis)conduct and, also very important, it would be 
beneficial for those whose interests are implicated by virtuous promises—
e.g., the planet and people.  
Granted, these recommendations require profound adjustments in the 
application and interpretation of state consumer laws, but the limiting 
principle offered herein should help to make the adjustments more 
palatable. With these upgrades, identity-harmed consumers would have a 
better chance of having their grievances recognized in court. As discussed, 
cases involving affirmative misrepresentations or lies (e.g., Dieselgate) are 
more likely to succeed than omissions cases. However, even if successful, 
both types of cases encounter obstacles at the remedies stage, when it comes 
to actually redressing identity harm. The next Part examines this problem. 
V. REIMAGINING REMEDIES  
Just as consumers can experience identity harm absent a physical injury, 
so too can they experience identity harm absent an economic injury or 
pecuniary loss. Particularly where the source of the harm is a virtuous 
dupery that makes the consumer complicit in hurting others, attempting to 
measure identity harm in money terms is a losing proposition. Put another 
way, where complicity is involved, as it is with virtually all sustainability-
related virtuous promises, identity harm demands something beyond money 
damages to be remedied. What identity-harmed consumers need to be made 
whole is for the company to come through on its original promise and/or to 
repair the damage done. This Part explains why remedies must look beyond 
market value to redress identity harm and offers examples of the types of 
injunctive remedies that would restore identity-harmed consumers’ sense of 
values-integrity. Such remedies would be beneficial for the consumer, but 
also for those injured by the broken virtuous promise—e.g., the planet or 













A. Market Value Is Not the Only Value That Counts 
Economic harm is often measured by looking at the drop in market value 
of a good after a defect or quality problem has been discovered. For 
example, the market value of the Dieselgate cars plummeted after the 
scandal broke because the cars were technically illegal to sell and drive in 
the United States. Because of the illegality, VW placed a stop-sale on the 
cars.177 This effectively drove the market value of the cars down to zero 
dollars, generating sharp and obvious pecuniary loss for car owners. But 
what of those individuals who sold their dirty-diesels before the scandal 
broke and who received pre-scandal market value for their cars? Can it be 
said that they suffered no harm because they suffered no—or only limited—
pecuniary loss? As I argued in Identity Harm, to answer this question in the 
affirmative would be grossly under-protective.178 The plaintiffs in Nemet v. 
Volkswagen Grp. Of Am., Inc. were comprised precisely of individuals who 
sold their cars prior to the reveal of VW’s deception.179 Regardless of the 
resale price they obtained for their cars, these individuals should be treated 
as Dieselgate victims because they received and drove dirty-diesel vehicles, 
not the environmentally friendly vehicles they were promised. VW’s 
virtuous dupery injured both categories of victims, those who sold pre-
scandal and those who (absent the stop-sale order) would have sold post-
scandal; it turned both groups “into some of the biggest polluters on the 
road.”180 This (defamation-like) conversion occurred for as long and for as 
many miles as the cars were on the road, regardless of when they were on 
the road.  
Pecuniary loss is thus not the only dimension along which harm is 
experienced, nor is it the only dimension along which harm should be 
measured. While the Nemet complaint helpfully exposes some of the 
limitations of looking to resale value for loss, it does not go far enough in 
terms of asserting non-financial losses; it limits the recovery sought only to 
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a share of the clean premium paid on the cars.181 The premium is the wrong 
measure of harm for two reasons. First, it is difficult to calculate because 
the U.S. market for diesel cars is small, so reference points are limited.182 
Second, even if the clean premium could be determined, it would provide 
only a poor estimate of the harm. For some, the premium figure might be 
representative of the value they assign to cleanness or greenness; for others, 
it might be grossly inadequate and under-compensatory; and for others still, 
it might be over-compensatory.183 This is a common problem with coming 
up with market prices that flatten people’s individual preferences and lump 
divergent preferences together.184 Here, however, the problem can be 
avoided by looking to a different measure of harm altogether.  
For identity-harmed consumers, the right measure of damages is not the 
diminished resale value or the clean (or social) premium, but rather the lost 
greenness of the purchase.185 And lost greenness can be measured at least as 
well as the clean premium. Returning to Nemet as a case example, a price 
could be attached to the above-advertised (and illegal) emissions generated 
by the dirty-diesels and multiplied by the number of miles driven by the 
plaintiffs while they still owned their vehicles.186 Excess emissions would 
thus be converted into a lost greenness figure that could be used to calculate 
money damages, which could then be placed into a climate mitigation 
fund.187 The recommendation in Identity Harm, as here, is to move away 
from premiums as the measure of damages and instead design remedies that 
address the actual harm-in-the-world created by broken virtuous promises.  
B. Some Inspiration 
To be made whole, identity-harmed consumers need the offending 
company to come through on its original virtuous promise and/or to repair 
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any damage done. Identity harm thus demands injunctive relief. Yet, be it 
in contract or tort, remedies tend to steer clear of reparations, or what Omri 
Ben-Shahar and Ariel Porat refer to as “restoration remedies” that address 
“the underlying interest that was impaired and gave rise to the emotional 
harm.”188 Likewise, under consumer law, the most common remedy for 
successful UDAP claims is money damages, typically keyed off of the 
purchase price and sometimes enhanced with statutory or punitive 
damages.189 To the extent that injunctive remedies are employed in the 
consumer law context, it is typically only to enjoin the company from 
continuing to engage in the bad practice at issue (e.g., false advertising or 
mispricing), not to fix the harm flowing from the bad practice (e.g., 
environmental degradation or labor rights violations).190 As Lauren Willis 
observes, “Consumer-law enforcement today remains stuck in the twentieth 
century,” and injunctive remedies are inadequate to the task of redressing 
consumer harms, being “too narrow, uniform, and static to counter twenty-
first century fraud.”191  
Some legal innovation is therefore in order. To this end, Ben-Shahar and 
Porat have designed a novel framework for awarding and administering 
restorative remedies to redress emotional harms, and they explicitly include 
identity harm within their target harm-group.192 They propose a “sorting 
mechanism” that separates sincere from faker claimants.193 The mechanism 
operates by offering plaintiffs 
two remedial options . . . : (1) restoration, paid directly to repair in 
full the underlying interest of a Sincere; and (2) money, a “modest” 
unrestricted sum of cash paid to the plaintiff’s pocket.  
A Sincere would choose Option One because she values restoration 
and because Option Two—with only a small sum of money in it—is 
not attractive enough relative to the value of restoration. A Faker 
would choose Option Two, no matter how small the sum of money 
in it, because Option One is worthless to her. In a sense, Option Two 
is designed as a bait for the sole purpose of smoking out the unharmed 
                                                 
188. Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 51, at 1904–15 (explaining why tort and contract law 
remedies are inadequate for addressing emotional harms stemming from an impaired underlying interest, 
meaning the “aggrieved party’s plan, agenda, values, or set of preferences that the wrongdoer was 
obligated to promote or protect”). 
189. CARTER, supra note 143, at 18–21. 
190. Id. at 6. 
191. Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Remedies: Ordering Firms to Eradicate Their Own 
Fraud, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 7–8 (2017). 
192. Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 51, at 1934 n.105.  
193. Id. at 1905.  
 











Fakers. By choosing the money damages, a Faker reveals her bluff 
and would be counted out from the restoration calculation. A Faker 
gets money for nothing—a modest amount of pecuniary recovery 
despite suffering no emotional harm. This is a standard inefficiency 
in any sorting equilibrium, a necessary evil to overcome the problem 
of incomplete information. But as long as the money damages in 
Option Two are small, this distortion is relatively benign.194  
The proposed mechanism would fill a yawning remedial gap for 
addressing not-just-economic harms, like identity harm. Foremost, it would 
make restorative, reparations-oriented, remedies available to address 
identity harm.195 Additionally, it would reduce the financial incentives for 
fakers to bring opportunistic law suits. Further, it would limit the amount of 
money damages flowing from broken virtuous promises, which should 
provide some comfort to companies concerned about financial liability. 
Indeed, were the mechanism to be applied to remedy the identity harms 
contemplated in this Article, successful claims would result, not in a 
financial fleecing of the promise-breaking company, but rather in a real push 
to improve its social-environmental performance. Equally important, the 
mechanism does not seek to “translate agony into dollars” by coming up 
with a money measure of plaintiffs’ individual emotional harm; that would 
require peering into the souls of claimants and attempting to rank or rate 
their distress—a singularly complex and unappetizing prospect.196 Instead, 
the authors propose directing restoration damages toward “the reparable 
underlying interest.”197 Thus, rather than being tacked to a hard-to-quantify 
emotional harm or to an under-representative purchase price, remedies 
would be tacked to the harm-in-the-world created by the broken virtuous 
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promise. Ben-Shahar and Porat’s approach is entirely consistent and 
complementary with my own emphasis on reparations over plaintiff 
compensation for addressing identity harm. 
Since Ben-Shahar and Porat have already laid much of the groundwork 
for a mechanism that can administer restorative remedies, this Section 
focuses on the content of such remedies. The objective is to identify some 
substantive (rather than procedural) characteristics of restorative remedies. 
This Section reviews three examples of restoration-focused remedies for 
repairing environmental, labor, and human rights abuses, including the 
Dieselgate settlement, the Nike v. Kasky settlement, and decisions of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights.  
Before launching into these examples, and to get a richer flavor for what 
identity-harmed consumers themselves say that they need in order to be 
made whole, it is worth revisiting the Sud case, as well as a case involving 
spiritual identity harm, Gupta v. Asha Enterprises, where a restaurant 
erroneously served Hindu vegetarian patrons meat-filled samosas.198 
Although both cases were dismissed, the content of the plaintiffs’ remedies 
requests deserves consideration. To repair their spiritual harm, the Gupta 
plaintiffs sought moneys sufficient to cover their travel to the Ganges River 
in India where they could partake in a purifying bathing ceremony.199 This 
shows that, to be made whole, identity-harmed consumers require 
something more profoundly restorative than simple money damages keyed 
off of the purchase price; they require remedies that will restore their sense 
of values-integrity. In a similar vein, the Sud plaintiffs sought both 
compensatory and injunctive remedies, including injunctions “against the 
non-disclosure of Defendants’ tainted food supply chain,” and injunctions 
prohibiting “Defendants’ continued buying, distributing, and selling 
products that they know, should know, or suspect to be tainted by slave labor 
or human trafficking.”200 Had the court awarded these remedies, it would 
have allowed consumers to steer clear of purchases that pit them against 
their other-regarding values going forward. It would also have gone some 
distance toward repairing the bad practice (sourcing seafood from tainted 
supply chains) by putting an end to it, even if it would not have undone the 
harm-in-the-world already caused by that practice. The Gupta and Sud 
plaintiffs’ requests offer powerful support for the proposition that remedies 
can be tailored to address identity harm without wading too far into the 
torturous waters of subjective value and personal preferences.  
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The following examples offer a more detailed description of restorative 
remedies, as well as some guidelines for shaping restorative “asks” going 
forward.  
The Dieselgate Settlement: The settlement presented Dieselgate victims 
with two options: either sell your car back to VW at pre-scandal prices with 
some extra (up to $10,000) money on top, or hold on to your car for two to 
three years while VW develops a fix for the emissions violations.201 Should 
VW fail to develop an agency-approved fix, they will have to buy the cars 
back.202 This is a generous financial compensation package, to be sure. 
However, on its own, it does little to undo the environmental harm—or 
restore the lost greenness—caused by Dieselgate. And that is where the EPA 
stepped in, requiring VW to pay approximately $2.7 billion into a trust fund 
“to fully mitigate the total, lifetime excess NOx emissions” from the 
Dieselgate cars.203 The fifty U.S. states, the District of Columbia, Puerto 
Rico, and the Indian tribes were designated as eligible fund beneficiaries 
and invited to apply for allocations based on the intensity of their exposure 
to Dieselgate, as inferred from the number of registered dirty-
diesels.204 Awarded moneys are being used to finance “mitigation actions” 
that reduce NOx, including “replacing or repowering older engines” and 
“replacing older city transit buses with new electric-powered transit city 
buses.”205 The settlement further required VW to invest $2 billion in Zero 
Emission Vehicles (ZEV),206 ZEV charging infrastructure for multi-unit 
dwellings, workplaces, and public sites, and ZEV promotion and awareness-
raising campaigns through brand-neutral education and public outreach 
programs.207 It also provided that VW must take measures to prevent future 
problems, including separating emissions-testing personnel from design 
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personnel.208 Finally, VW had to establish a steering committee to ensure 
compliance with the Clean Air Act and a whistleblower system.209  
The settlement has something for everyone: compensatory damages plus, 
most important for identity harm, injunctive remedies that seek to repair the 
environmental harm caused by Dieselgate and prevent future occurrences. 
It offers an inspiring example of the types of restorative measures required 
to make identity-harmed consumers whole. However, the EPA’s 
involvement was crucial for obtaining these remedies. Without that 
intervention—which came about because the agency chose to react to VW’s 
Clean Air Act violations, something we should not assume would happen 
under the current EPA—it is unlikely that identity-harmed Dieselgate 
victims would have seen their grievances redressed.210 On their own, 
identity-harmed consumers who engage in civil regulation via UDAP 
litigation have virtually no chance of obtaining the restorative remedies they 
need to be made whole. State consumer laws should therefore be upgraded 
to give private claimants more expansive access to restorative remedies. 
The Nike v. Kasky settlement: For inspiration on restorative remedies 
designed to redress broken social promises pertaining to labor, perhaps the 
best place to look is private settlement agreements, rather than court 
decisions. This is unsurprising since settlements are privately negotiated and 
tailored to meet the particular needs of the parties. Unfortunately, most 
settlement agreements are confidential; as such, it is difficult to review their 
content, even if this would be invaluable for purposes of learning about 
innovative, beyond-money remedies. Fortunately, some parts of the Nike v. 
Kasky settlement have been made public, offering a useful reference for 
understanding restorative remediation.211 Though much of it remains secret, 
we do know that the settlement included an agreement by Nike to pay $1.5 
million to the Fair Labor Association, a multi-stakeholder initiative that is 
“dedicated to protecting workers’ rights around the world.”212 These 
proceeds were earmarked for amelioration of factory working conditions, 
including factory infrastructure, and upgrading factory standards and 
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monitoring.213 Additionally, the settlement included at least $500,000 per 
year to fund micro-loan programs in support of foreign employees’ 
entrepreneurial ventures and educational programs in Nike’s partner 
factories.214  
While the first piece of the settlement was directed at improving Nike’s 
factories overseas, the second was directed at supporting Nike factory 
employees (and their communities). Importantly, although the settlement 
did involve money, that money was not transferred into the pockets of 
Kasky or the California residents he represented. Instead, it was dedicated 
to repairing the harm-in-the-world,  namely, the harm to Nike’s factory 
workers, which is what motivated Kasky to bring his claim in the first place. 
This example also shows how identity harm can be redressed, even when it 
is not possible to undo the underlying injury. In contrast to Dieselgate, 
where it was possible to offset the excess emissions through a climate 
mitigation fund, no amount of money can erase Nike’s labor rights 
violations or the injuries that its workers suffered as a result. However, 
measures can be taken to mitigate the effects of these violations and to avoid 
their recurrence.  
Inter-American Court of Human Rights opinions: Tom Antkowiak 
explains that the Inter-American Court has a fascinating history of designing 
innovative reparatory remedies in cases involving human rights 
violations.215 As with labor rights violations, human rights violations cannot 
be undone or erased; as such, remedies must focus on addressing (where 
possible) the effects of the violations and on preventing future violations. 
Reparatory measures thus include “restitution and cessation, rehabilitation, 
apologies, memorials, legislative reform, training programs, and 
community development schemes.”216 For example, in Juvenile 
Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay,217 a case involving a juvenile detention 
center that was “extremely overcrowded, plagued by violence, and had been 
ravaged by three fires within eighteen months that led to several deaths and 
injuries,”218 the Court required psychological treatment for the entire 
population of over 3000 victims, medical care for those children who had 
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suffered burns in the fires, and “the establishment of special education and 
vocational assistance programs for former detainees.”219  
The Court thus attempted to “reverse the damaging effects” of the human 
rights violations attached to the detention facility.220 In other cases, the 
Court has ordered scholarships for higher education, professional skills 
courses, as well as funding for literacy programs.221 This illustrates how 
human rights violations against the citizens of poor countries, whether 
committed by government or by TNCs, can be creatively remedied. 
Otherwise put, there exist ways to repair injuries that afflict humans and that 
cannot easily be monetized. Identity-harmed consumers seeking redress for 
their unwitting participation in labor and human rights abuses would do well 
to look to the Court for inspiration in crafting their prayers for relief. 
In summary, identity-harmed consumers require something beyond 
financial compensation to be made whole. To the extent possible, remedies 
should seek to undo the harm-in-the-world brought about by a broken 
virtuous promise. This is the only sure avenue for restoring consumers’ 
values-integrity. This Section discussed a possible mechanism for 
administering such restorative remedies, as proposed by Ben-Shahar and 
Porat, and offered some inspiration for developing the content of 
restoration, drawing on existing examples from the spheres of 
environmental protection and labor and human rights. The examples 
selected illustrate that it is absolutely possible to craft restorative remedies 
that are up to the task of redressing identity harm; all that is required is some 
innovative thinking, along with a deepened appreciation for the need to 
better equip consumers to defend their other-regarding expectations.  
CONCLUSION 
The choices we make about what and how to consume define some part 
of who we are and want to be in the world. As such, these choices are 
connected to our identity. When someone makes a purchase that they 
believe to be in line—or at least not grossly out of line—with their values, 
money is not the only thing that changes hands; something more morally 
intimate becomes entwined in the transaction. Should it turn out that the 
virtuous promise on which the purchase rested was false or empty, 
consumers can experience identity harm. As it stands, there is far too much 
room for corporations to cultivate and exploit consumers’ other-regarding 
expectations, and far too little accountability if and when they are caught.  
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This Article reviewed the possibilities in tort, contract, and state 
consumer law for addressing identity harm and found each of these branches 
of our protective regime to be sorely lacking, both at the claim-making and 
at the remedies stage of litigation. These legal deficiencies must be 
corrected, particularly given the urgent sustainability challenges facing our 
world and the ever-more heroic expectations placed on consumers in 
today’s America. This Article proposed a way forward by operationalizing 
identity harm as a new consumer protection tool. Consumers can use this 
tool to defend their own virtuous interests in court, but also to advance the 
interests of those affected by identity-harming transactions—the planet and 
the people involved in production. Implementing the recommendations 
made here would sharpen consumers’ civil regulatory teeth, empowering 
them to better safeguard their own values while having greater influence on 
the social and environmental (mis)conduct of TNCs. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss4/7
